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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the historical events that lead to the establishment of the 
AGCC organization and analyzes the cooperation of the AGCC countries in politics, 
security, economy, as well as defense spending at lower life cycle cost. U.S foreign 
military sales (FMS) are a good tool to facilitate the arms trades between the U.S and the 
AGCC countries. The thesis discuss the external and internal threats to the region and the 
AGCC relations with the west. The AGCC countries must enhance the existing Shield 
Force and maintain its alliance with the West. 
This thesis also discusses the economies of the AGCC countries and indicates that 
the AGCC countries are still largely oil-based economies. Moreover, the economic 
characteristics of these countries indicate that they are not ready at their current stage to 
form a full monetary union. However, these countries are economically qualified for 
several forms of partial monetary integration, such as an exchange rate coordination 
arrangement, capital market integration. Also, the thesis suggests additional economic 
diversification programs are needed and essential to enhance the development of 
sustainable economies. Finally, this thesis provides recommendations for exchange rate 
unification and monetary integration among the AGCC countries to strengthen and move 
the AGCC forward in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The main idea behind the establishment of the AGCC countries was to provide six 
Arab oil-producing countries with a formal security arrangement through their 
cooperation in the political and military fields. However, this idea, or framework, for 
cooperation among these countries was later expanded to include all other fields and was 
seriously considered for the first time on February 4, 1981. On that date, the six countries 
decided to establish a cooperation council in order to coordinate, integrate, and establish 
close ties among them in a solid economic, social and political unity and stability. These 
countries, which are located in the Arab Gulf region, are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, bound together and formed a regional 
organization called "The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council" (AGCC). These countries have 
an estimated combined population of about 20 million and a land area of about 2,653,000 
square kilometers. On May 25, 1981, the rulers of these countries signed the official 
agreement, known as "the Unified Economic Agreement," In this agreement, the 
countries started a new chapter in their modern history that they hope will result in future 
benefits, especially at the economic and social levels. So far, and compared to previous 
attempts of economic and political integration by other groups in the Arab world, the 
AGCC seems to be the most enduring and promising experience of all. But the road to 
establishing a full economic or political union among the AGCC member countries is a 
long one and still has many obstacles. For example, intra-AGCC trade seems to be 
growing at a slow rate. Moreover, the economic coordination efforts and economic ties 
that have been established over the last fourteen years indicate that the AGCC at its 
current stage may at best be described as a free trade area. 
A. OBJECTIVES 
The basic objectives of the AGCC are clearly to achieve cooperation among the 
member countries in all fields as a prelude to unity. Also to strengthen the links of 
cooperation among the people of the member countries in different fields. Moreover to 
establish similar systems among the member countries in all fields, including economics 
and finance, commerce, customs and communication, education and culture and 
legislation and administration. Also to stimulate scientific and technological progress in 
the fields of industry, mineralogy, agriculture, and marine and animal resources. 
Moreover, to establish common projects, and encourage the cooperation of the private 
sector for the common good of the people of the member countries. Also discussed, 
future changes to the dynamic Security program appear to be offer. The existing security 
assistance program between the U.S and the AGCC countries. The efficiency of the 
program will be analyzed and potential improvements identified that will benefit for both 
the U.S and the AGCC countries. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: 
What are the future requirement for enhancing I developing AGCC countries? 
Supporting questions include: 
Why was the AGCC created? 
What has actually been generated? 
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How effective has AGCC countries so far? 
What are the benefits of AGCC? 
How could Cooperative Co-production be implemented to improve the trade 
relation between the U.S. and the AGCC? 
What are the benefits from operation desert storm? 
C. RESEARCH SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will focus on the economic of the AGCC countries and 
shows that AGCC countries are still largely oil-based economies, the main purpose for 
establishing the AGCC, and proves that it was not created just as a defensive alliance as it 
is generally perceived in the West. The AGCC was formed for cooperation in all fields 
among its member countries. To demonstrate this fact, this thesis discusses the historical 
events that lead to the establishment of this organization and analyzes the cooperation of 
the member countries in the area of politics, security, economy, as well as the 
development of defense strategy to reach an efficient strategy that serves future defense 
requirement. One solution to obtain state- of art weapon systems with lower life cycle 
cost. U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) are a good tool to facilitate the arms trades 
between the U.S and the AGCC countries. Finally, the thesis provides general 
recommendation to strengthen the AGCC countries and move it forward in the future. 
Program from 1981 to the present. It will concentrate upon the effects that reform has 
had upon its benefit structure, eligibility requirements and financing. 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to predict exactly which, or how many, of the 
proposed methods of Security reform might actually be enacted into annual meeting. 
Only a presentation and discussion of the most publicized proposals will be offered. 
It is also beyond the scope of this thesis to make recommendations to the current 
or future administrations as to which proposals would prove to be most beneficial, or 
which proposals should in fact be adopted. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis is to conduct a literature review on economy 
and policy aspect from archival research of books, as well as a literature search of books, 
magazine articles, newspaper articles, embassies, people and other library and 
information sources in order to provide appropriate frame of reference and information. 
This data and information will be developed conclusion. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is written to provide wide prospective about the formation and the 
objectives of the AGCC, which is not limited to security cooperation. Therefore, in the 
second chapter, I will discuss the political cooperation, the formation and the roles of the 
AGCC countries. In the third chapter, I will address the security alliance by examining 
the internal and external threats and the collective AGCC countries defense plans. In the 
fourth chapter, I will examine the economic cooperation achievements and the defense 
spending of the AGCC. Acquisition systems were to reach an efficient strategy that serve 
future defense requirements. U.S foreign military sales (FMS) are a good tool to facilitate 
the arms trades between the U.S and the AGCC countries. Finally, the thesis seeks to 
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provide a conclusion of the main points discusses in various chapters, and provide 
recommendations to promote and enhance AGCC economic development. 
5 
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II. · THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
The Current political system of the AGCC countries is almost identical, they have 
similar historical backgrounds, and they share the same language, religion, and social 
beliefs and customs. The political systems of these countries are somewhat unique to 
them and are difficult to define in terms of the conventional political systems adopted by 
other countries in the rest of the world. Peterson [Ref. I: p.27] suggested that the political 
systems of the AGCC 
Are most accurately described as traditional monarchies, in which 
governments are led by extended ruling families in informal but 
significant consultation with religious and other tribal components of 
society. These historical means of governance serve as the core of the 
Arab Gulf political systems, and the national institutions and 
bureaucracies that have arisen more recently have been grafted to them. 
Specifically, an extended ruling family who came to power since the 
establishment of these countries governs each of these countries excepts the U .A.E. The 
ruler of each country is usually the head of the family or a member of the ruling family 
who has been selected by other members of the family. In the case of U.A.E., however, 
the ruler of the country is a member of one of the seven ruling families that govern the 
seven emirates of the U .A.E. he is appointed through consultation among the heads or the 
sheiks of the seven families. Therefore, there are no public elections or political parties in 
the AGCC countries and public participation in the governments of these countries is 
traditionally limited to consultation or advice to members of the ruling families. 
Predominant members of the ruling families of these countries, including the rulers, 
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usually have daily or weekly informal meetings with religious and tribal leaders, 
businessmen, and other citizens in order to discuss public issues and problems, as well as 
hear grievances and provide consultation on any matter of public concern. These 
meetings, which are open to the public, are known as the "majlis." However, during the 
last two decades, all the states started appointing an increasing number of private citizens, 
who are not a part of these ruling families, to key government positions in order to these 
ruling families, to key government positions in order to allow the public more 
participation in the political system. As a result of the recent public demand for more 
direct participation in the political systems, the current leaders or governments of almost 
all of these countries have authorized the creation or the reactivation of the previously 
suspended consultative or national assemblies in the other countries are usually appointed 
by the rulers of these countries. These members, of course, are not a part of the ruling 
families. [Ref. I: p.34] 
The main features and similarities among the political systems of the AGCC 
countries that distinguish them from other political systems were summarized by 
Peterson [Ref. I: p.26] as follows: 
First, the newly emergent governmental structures of the six Arab 
Gulf countries have involved from the Arab tribalism that has existed in 
the region for centuries despite persistent foreign occupation and designs. 
Second, although these countries have gained independence only recently, 
owing to a history of foreign occupation and influence, they represent in 
general a continuum of previous and long-established governing systems, 
Third, these systems are all vertically based and traditional authority 
structures led by ruling families and influenced heavily, first, by Islamic 
principles and practices and, then, by other deeply held social beliefs and 
codes. Fourth, the ruling systems continue to rely on time-tested methods 
of indirect public participation such as the majlis, though in the last 20 
years efforts to involve other segments of the populations directly into the 
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governmental spheres have been undertaken. Fifth, they have shown a 
considerable ability to adapt to changing political and economic 
circumstances. Finally, these governments share a number of perceptions 
regarding foreign policy issues, including an ideological opposition to 
communism, adherence to free market principles and practices, and a 
desire to remove the region from foreign designs and potential conflict. 
Independence came in 1961 for Kuwait and in 1971 for Bahrain, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates. While the modem Kingdom of Saudi Arabia dates only from 1934 
under that name. Oman has always been technically independent. 
In examining the political system in the AGCC countries, it is clear that several 
essential conditions are present to enable the AGCC countries to form lasting political 
cooperation, which may lead to political integration in the future. I am encouraged by the 
fact that the Arabian Gulf region had witnessed two successful integrations in the past. 
The first one was the unification of the Saudi Arabia by the late king Abdullaziz, founder 
of the kingdom of modem Saudi Arabia; the second one was the unification of the seven 
Arab Emirates, now known as United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). These two experiences 
encourage the prospects for political integration of the six Arab Gulf countries since the 
previous successful integration took place in the same region and among similar people. 
[Ref.2: p.15] 
Having said that, I am aware many things have changed in the region, which 
makes it different from the past two experiences. At present, total integration among 
sovereign countries in the area is extremely difficult to accomplish. Other types of 
integration such as economic integration seem to be easier to achieve, simply because the 
independent countries would not have to surrender their sovereignty, and that is why the 
AGCC countries focus their effort more at this stage on the economic and social 
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integration, which are essential for any political integration which must come at final 
stage of integration process. [Ref.2: p.16] 
B. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE AGCC 
Each of the individual AGCC has different strategic needs and vulnerabilities. 
Saudia Arabia is the largest of the Gulf countries in terms of both geography and military 
forces and is the key to any successful effort at regional cooperation in defense. Yet, 
Saudi Arabia has a low ratio of forces for the space in its critical defensive area, 
particularly along its border with Iraq. It cannot create an effective defense without its 
neighbors. 
Kuwait shares a common border with Iraq and is only a short distance from Iran. 
No foreseeable mix of Kuwait, AGCC countries, other Arab. Or U.S forces can offer 
Kuwait full security against another round of Iraq surprise attacks or surprise Iranian air, 
amphibious, and missile attack. Kuwait's small territory and population keep its military 
vulnerable, and the country also has massive oil and gas resources to protect the other 
smaller Gulf countries face more serious problems. They are spread along the coast of the 
southern Gulf. If any of these countries fell into hostile hands, it would be a major 
strategic springboard for intervention by Iran or IRAQ, or a constant threat to the internal 
security of its neighbors. A hostile air force are navy, based in the Gulf countries, could 
also make it far more difficult for other Arab countries or the U.S to project power into 
the region. [Ref.3: p.9] 
The AGCC is a successful experience in the Arab world politics. It has been able 
to overcome many serious challenges in the region. The most serious one was the Iraq 
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invasion to one of its members (Kuwait) on August 2, 1990. It was a very difficult 
challenge and experience for the AGCC countries, because the full-scale attack came 
from another Arab country, which was unprecedented in the modern Arab history. 
However, the AGCC countries bound together and provided unlimited political, 
economic, military, social and emotional support to Kuwait. The forces of all the AGCC 
countries took active part in the liberation of Kuwait. Without the enormous support of 
the AGCC countries (especially Saudi Arabia), it would have been almost impossible for 
the coalition forces, lead by the U.S to liberate Kuwait. [Ref.2: p.16] 
The invasion of Kuwait had a great impact on the social and the political system 
in the AGCC countries. The AGCC countries experienced and developed a new political 
approach, especially with relation between the government and their people. This 
experience led the political elites to rethink their approach to politics and seek more 
extensive domestic support and stronger foreign alliances. Also, the Gulf war provided 
the incentive and the will to get the people more involved in the decision making process. 
As domestic, regional and international variables continue to have great impact on the 
Arabian Gulf, the AGCC countries are being forced to deal with the issue of political 
participation more seriously than have in the past. 
This fact was clearly demonstrated in the increase of the popular participation in 
the decision making process in the AGCC countries, coupled with the formation of new 
political institutions in the form of (Shura Councils) and the expansion of power of these 
Shura councils. Additionally, most of the AGCC countries have published their written 
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constitutions, which protect individual rights and define the relationship between the 
governments and the people. 
Most AGCC countries have realized that since Gulf women constitute almost half 
of the population, and they should be given real opportunities to take their rightful place 
in society. Also, all AGCC countries agree that real security could only be achieved 
through political participation of their people and social justice. 
Different ruling families rule the Gulf countries. The traditional pillars of the 
ruling families' legitimacy were based on traditional power sharing in a tribal society and 
Islam as represented in Islamic law. Historically, the leader of the tribal community 
essentially serves as a 'chairman" rather than a ruler, who consulted tribal, religious and 
merchant notables of the community before taking action. Rulers also found it necessary 
to govern in accordance with, or at least in reference to the Islamic principles of 
consultation (Shura) and consensus (Ijma). [Ref. I: p.8] 
All AGCC countries attempted to marry traditional and rationalist bases of 
legitimacy by establishing advisory or Consultative Councils (Majlis Al-Shura). They 
were the logical choice. Majlis represents the form of the institution and the Shura its 
constitutional essence. Majlis is widely used for a parliament throughout the Islamic 
world. Traditionally, the Majlis is a place where relatively free exchange of ideas and 
opinions on a wide variety of social, political and economic matters are discussed and 
debated. Also, the Majlis is an open meeting where anyone can petition their leaders from 
the king down to the Governors of the provinces and local leaders. In other words, the 
leaders are accessible to the people. 
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The ruling families in the AGCC countries are ruling elites, and it is generally 
accepted within tradition and tribal context to exercise authority in the name of the 
people. Members of the ruling families are under the same obligations and constraints as 
are all citizens, although this remains subject to abuse so that the ruling families continue 
to monopolize power. The rest of the people will tolerate this monopoly only as long as 
they continue to perceive the monarchical system as legitimate and accept the authority 
of these ruling families. [Ref.4: p.20] 
Table I. below shows a summary of the members of the AGCC countries and the 
ruling families: 
Country Ruler Ruling Family Total Area Population 
Bahrain Hamad Bin* Isa Al-Khalifa 550,000 694km (Amir)** 
Qatar Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani 500,000 I 1,437km (Amir) 
Oman Qaboos Bin Said Al-Bu Saidi 2,000,000 312,000 km (Sultan) 
Fahad Bin 
Saudi Arabia Abdulaziz Al-Saud 17,000,000 2,331,000 km 
(King) 
Kuwait Jabir Al Ahmed Al-Sabah 2,000,000 17,818km (Amir) 
Emirates (UAE) Zaid Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan 2,000,000 77,700 km (President) 
*Means "son of' **Means Prince 24,050,000 2,750,649 
.. . . Source: After Ref. J. E. Peterson, "The AGCC Steps Toward Poht1cal part1c1pat10n," CSlS, 1988, New 
York, p. 5. 
The discovery of oil in huge quantities has changed the AGCC countries and their 
inhabitants. The oil wealth enabled the AGCC countries to carry out explosive 
developmental programs. Economic prosperity touched every facet of life in those 
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countries. The whole infrastructure for Social Services, public Services, and industrial 
development was created in a few years. Demands for consumer goods increased a 
thousand-fold within a decade. There is no taxation of any sort, and the assumption is 
made that when the countries relies on taxation the question of democracy becomes 
"Unavoidable issue". 
There is little reason to suppose that the ruling families in the AGCC countries 
will be transformed in to Western-style parliamentary or presidential democracies in the 
foreseeable future. Western-style democracy will not work in the AGCC countries. 
Therefore, the AGCC countries wisely have chosen the Consultative councils (Majlis Al 
Shura) or Advisory Councils as a first step toward a limited democracy which is the most 
suitable for these type of societies, because it satisfies the needs and addresses the 
concerns of both societies. The official establishment of the National councils has 
enhanced the tribal or the social democracy that existed in all AGCC countries. Also, this 
enabled the AGCC countries to persuade both societies to accept the National Council 
(Shura Councils) as a means for limited political participation in the decision making 
process. [Ref.4: p.22] 
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III. SECURITY 
By a conventional definition of security, that is to say protection from foreign 
military attack, the AGCC countries are more secure than at any time in their independent 
existence. The defeat of Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War reduced the military capabilities 
and the political capacity of one potential threat. Iran's military travail during its eight-
year war with Iraq, its limited air power and nonexistent amphibious capability, and its 
own internal political military threat to the AGCC countries. In formulating their security 
strategies, the rulers of the AGCC countries have to face both the possibility of foreign 
attack and the need to maintain their domestic positions. [Ref.5: p.62] 
The six Arab countries of the Gulf have taken a variety of steps to enhance their 
security. First, they banded together and defense cooperation among them through the 
AGCC's collective security arrangements, a sensible move that not only provides a little 
more force, manpower and financial resources for defense purposes, but also makes 
considerable sense economically and culturally. Second, led by Saudi's predominant size 
and financial resources, the AGCC countries embarked on ambitious military 
modernization programs. These efforts cannot overcome obvious constraints of small size 
and limited manpower but, nevertheless, will help these countries to meet a myriad of 
lesser security threats. Third, the AGCC countries have worked toward accommodation 
with more powerful and radical neighbors in the Gulf, as well as elsewhere in the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Middle East. They have also sought friendship as well as economic and 
political cooperation with the U.S. and the West. However, mindful of the lessons of the 
past, they have insisted that military cooperation remain limited to an "over-the-horizon' 
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role. Acquiring new weapon systems and signing bilateral agreements with the U.S. and 
other Western countries will enhance the security in the region and will help its 
stabilization [Ref.3: p. 7] 
A. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, 1980-88 
The single most important factor precipitating the Iran-Iraq conflict was the 
Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, the outbreak of the war provided the first 
threat to the AGCC countries. The major regional response to the war was the formation 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The AGCC aimed to promote military and political 
cooperation, but could do little against its two overbearing neighbors. The Gulf monarchs 
feared from the start that the war could spread, threatening their oil revenues and possibly 
their governments. Iranian leaders had made it clear that their revolution was suitable for 
export. The rulers were also troubled by Iraq's intentions; yet felt that they had no choice 
but to support Saddam Hussein financially. The AGCC countries contributed an 
estimated $35 billion in economic and military "loans" to Iraq with little prospect they 
would be repaired. [Ref.6: p.29] 
The AGCC countries supported Iraq in this ill-fated war; the Iranians reacted to 
the Iraqi air attack on its main oil terminal on the Island of Kharj by attacking ships 
destined for ports in Gulf countries that assisted Iraq in its war effort. Also, during the 
war some of the AGCC countries (Bahrain and Kuwait) accused Iran in getting involved 
of destabilizing incidents, including an abortive coup in Bahrain in 1981, terrorist activity 
in Kuwait in 1983, and violence in Mecca, resulting in the death of more than 400 
pilgrims. As a result of these attacks on the oil tankers, Kuwait sought the protection of 
16 
the U.S. to escort its vessels in the Gulf. The United States, determined to protect its 
interest in the region to ensure the flow of oil, accepted to place Kuwaiti oil tankers under 
the American Flag. Also, the British and Soviets took part in the re-flagging of Kuwaiti 
ships. Under this arrangement, Kuwait succeeded in protecting its oil tankers and Iran 
generally avoided interfering with Kuwait ships sailing under the major powers' 
protection. The war lasted for eight years. Heavy losses were sustained by both countries, 
which included both human casualties and the destruction of main cities, eventually 
forcing the Iranians to Accept a United Nations Cease-fire in August 1988. [Ref.4: p.38] 
B. THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991 
Unfortunately, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, altered political 
alignments in the Middle East, imperiled world energy supplies and confronted the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. with the first international crisis since the end of the cold 
war. It also marked the resumption of Saddam Hussein's quest to dominate the Gulf. The 
Iraq leader evidently regarded the capture of Kuwait as a low-risk adventure that its Arab 
neighbors would be powerless to reverse. Iraq's active armed forces totaled one million, 
by far the largest in the region (Kuwait had an army of 20,000). They were battle tested 
and well armed. President Saddam Hussein also calculated that neither his ally, the Soviet 
Union, nor the United States would intervene. [Ref.6: p.32] 
This war presented the AGCC countries with immediate threats and a direct 
challenge to their survival and existence. The invasion of Kuwait was not only rejected 
by the AGCC countries, but was condemned by the entire international community with 
the regrettable exception of a few Arab countries who felt that their moral principles 
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would be compromised and/or seeking vague economic advantages as promised by 
Saddam. The Iraqi invasion of its small neighbor, Kuwait, was a serious blow to Arab 
unity. It was an unprecedented event in the modern Arab history and the most traumatic 
in the history of the Arab league. 
Intelligence sources believed that, after Iraq completed its occupation of Kuwait, 
it was positioning its forces for a subsequent drive toward the Saudi oil fields and 
possibly continuing down toward other AGCC countries. [Ref.7: p.39] 
The U.N. issued a series of resolution condemning Iraq. The Security Council on 
August 2, called for Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. Again, 
to protect its interests in the region and as the only superpower in the world, the U.S. took 
the lead and formed a coalition from 28 countries and deployed more than 600,000 
ground, sea and air personnel to protect Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. The U.S 
provided the majority of the forces and military equipment. 
Command of the coalition forces was divided: Gen Norman Schwarzkopf headed 
the U.S., British and French Units; his Saudi counterpart, Lt. Gen Khalid Bin Sultan 
AbdulAziz, Al Saud, commanded units from 24 non-western countries, including troops 
from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait and other AGCC countries. In addition to 
20,000 Saudi troops and 7,000 Kuwaiti troops, an estimated 3,000 personnel from other 
AGCC countries took part in the land forces of the Coalition Offensive, which was 
known as Operation Desert Storm. On February 28, 1991, although Kuwait was liberated 
yet another tragic phase of the war had already begun, the suffering of the innocent Iraq 
people. [Ref.4: p. 41] 
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C. THREATS FACING THE ARAB GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 
1. The Iranian Threat 
The Persian threat to the Arab Gulf countries goes back hundreds of years in 
history. In the distant past, there have been many Persian invasions to the Arab side of the 
Gulf. It was driven by a strong tradition of struggle in the region. It was also the ambition 
of Iran, expressed earlier by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and then, more recently by 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors, to play the dominant role in the Gulf security. 
The suspicion, which the Sunni Muslims on the Arab side of the Gulf have toward the 
Shiite religious Imams who control Iran. Those factors are the main cause for the 
confrontation. They created a psychological threat and mistrust between the two groups. 
Having said that however, the Iranian and the Arabs are neighbors and have been living 
together for many centuries. They both contributed generously to the Islamic Civilization 
and there has been strong economic and cultural cooperation. [Ref.4: p.43] 
a. The Arms Race 
The military balance between Iran and Iraq was at rough parity in late 
1996, but over the next five years Iran will develop a significant advantage as it expands 
its ground forces, according to Dr. Andrew Rathmell [Ref.6: p.43], a security analyst at 
King's College, London. 
Tehran often argues that its arms purchases are merely a response 
to the weak position it found itself in at the end of war with Iraq. While it 
is true that Iran's inventory of hardware was badly depleted, its current 
acquisition programs are set to turn it into the regional superpower over 
the next decade. 
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In rearming, Iran has given priority to its maritime capabilities; it has 
bought three small submarines from Russia and anti-ship cruise missiles from China. It is 
attempting to acquire medium-and long-range ballistic missiles from China and North 
Korea, and it has increased its capability to manufacture its own arms. In September 
1997, the U.S. and Israeli governments expressed alarm that Iran, with aid from Russia 
and China, was rapidly developing a ballistic-missile program that could threaten 
neighboring countries within the next few years. In 1995 Russia agreed to complete a 
nuclear power plant, begun by Germany in the late 1970s, at Bushire on the Gulf coast. 
Over U.S. objections, Russia contracted to provide a 1,000-mega-watt nuclear reactor for 
the plant, to be completed in the year 2000, and may provide a second unit there in the 
future. The United States strongly opposes these deals for fear that Iran will use the 
expertise it gains to develop a nuclear weapon. If Iran got a working nuclear device, this 
would suddenly and radically change perceptions of the military balance in the region. 
Iran could destroy any hardened target, area target or city within the range of its delivery 
systems, and Iran's neighbors are extremely vulnerable to attacks on a few cities. Iran has 
growing capabilities to threaten its neighbors, but it is far from clear that it will 
aggressively use such capabilities or that they lead to war. Further, Iran faces a complex 
of military weaknesses and military strengths. [Ref.5: p.216] 
b. Border Tensions 
The main problem, which continues to strain the relationship between the 
AGCC and Iran, is its occupation of the three islands of Abu Mosa, Greater Tumb and 
Lesser Tumb. These islands are claimed by U.A.E. The three islands are strategically 
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located at the mouth of Strait of Hurmoz in the Arabian Gulf. They are all very small and 
Abu Mosa has a small amount of oil, while the two Tumbs have none, but strategically 
they are very important for both countries. In 1971 memorandum of understanding, Iran 
and Sharja agreed to share the administration of the island of Abu Musa without 
surrendering either's claim to sovereignty. This arrangement worked well for two 
decades, but when relations between Iran and the U .A.E. deteriorated, the validity of the 
understanding was called into question. [Ref.6: p.45] 
The U.A.E. has been working hard in politicizing and internationalizing 
the issue of its claims of ownership. U .A.E. claims that they belonged to Emirates of 
Sharjah and Ras al-khaimah prior to the formation of the U.A.E. and the Iranian occupied 
them by force in 1971 when the Emirates were weak. Iran adheres to its official position 
that: 
These islands have always belonged to Iran; the British took them 
in 1903 and gave them to the Emirates, but returned them to Iran in 1971. 
These islands are under Iranian sovereignty and if others do not accept this 
reality that is their problem. 
After the Gulf War, the U.A.E. broke a silence of 21 years and announced claims 
of ownership over all three islands after Iranian authorities prevented more than 100 
people of various Arab nationalities (mainly teachers) from entering Abu Musa in April 
and September 1991. The U.A.E. was very successful in drawing the Arab and world 
attention to its claim. The AGCC issued many statements supporting the U.A.E. claims. 
The Arab League has done the same and the UAE officials have brought up the issue in 
their annual addresses to the UN assembly. Also, the UAE is willing to take the case to 
the International Court of Justice at the Hague. However, Iran is not willing to accept this 
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proposal and is even not willing to negotiate the "ownership' of the island. Iran normally 
issued very strong statements to U.A.E claims; for example after the December 1992, 
AGCC Summit Meeting, Tehran declared that if UAE tried to take the island, it would 
have to "cross a sea of blood" to do so. Also, the Iranian military presence on Abu Musa 
remains relatively high and increased in times of tension. It has been confirmed that Iran 
has deployed Silkworm Missiles in Abu Musa recently; this action may increase the 
tension between Iran and UAE. [Ref.8: p.47] 
2. The Iraqi Threat 
Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq still to be a threat to the AGCC 
countries despite numerous attempts to break out of its isolation. In the current condition, 
after ten years of the Gulf War, Iraq continues to be a regional pariah country despite 
numerous attempts to break out of its isolation. It is safe to say that Iraq is unlikely to 
accept a significant American role in the area in the immediate future. It is highly 
unlikely, as well, that a Saddam-led Iraq can play a role in any regional security 
arrangement. [Ref.5: p.324] 
The AGCC countries were hoping that the crushing military defeat of Saddam 
Hussein in 1991 would bring an acceptable and more friendly Iraq government that 
would respect the sovereignty of the AGCC countries and help the Iraq people to get over 
the post-war problem. Unfortunately. This did not happen. Ten years later Saddam is still 
in power causing more security threats to his neighbors and creating more human misery 
for his own people. 
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Apart from the military threat, the Iraqi regime could utilize other methods such 
as subversion or secret agents to destabilize the AGCC countries. This is quite possible, 
but it is unlikely at the present time, due to the severe economic, political and internal 
security problems in Iraq, which pose a serious threat directly to Saddam, his family, and 
the Baathies regime. Also, Baghdad has tried to divide the AGCC countries by appealing 
to some countries such Qatar, U.A.E. and Oman and focusing criticism on other such as 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This technique has not been very successful. The AGCC 
countries realize the long-term impact of their division, but they do have different points 
of view on how to deal with Saddam's regime. It must be clear that the AGCC countries 
have no problems with the people of Iraq, but their problem is with Saddam's regime. 
Actually, all AGCC countries have considerable sympathy with the innocent Iraq people, 
as fellow Arabs who are for lifting of the unjustified UN sanctions against the poor 
people of Iraq who are paying the heavy price of Saddam's aggression. The AGCC 
leaders are really in a dilemma regarding the situation in Iraq. They are distressed that the 
Iraq people are continuing to suffer with no end in sight. The people of the AGCC really 
hope for the downfall of Saddam's Hussein to help the Iraqi people and establish a new 
page with an acceptable Iraqi government. 
After a tortured national debate that lasted throughout the fall of 1990, Congress 
voted on January 12, 1991, to authorize the use of force to remove the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait if it did not comply with a UN Security Council resolution and withdraw within 
three days. Saddam ignored the deadline, and allied air strikes began on January 16. 
Iraq's response was indecisive with no major attack on the allied forces and only SCUD 
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missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Israel. Following more than a month of 
bombing, which pulverized Iraq's infrastructure, an allied ground assault, "Desert 
Storm," began on February 23. In 100 hours, allied forces recaptured Kuwait. Before 
retreating, the Iraqis set fire to 800 Kuwaiti oil wells, which burned for several months, 
and discharged 6 million to 8 million gallons of oil into the Gulf. [Ref.4: p.49] 
a. The Arms Race 
The AGCC countries in particular are still concerned about possible Iraqi 
aggression, since an unrepentant Saddam Hussein remains in power and the Iraqi army 
still has a potential offensive capability of over 2,300 tanks, 4,400 armored vehicles, 
1,000 artillery pieces, 120 attack helicopters, 230 transport helicopters, and 300 aircraft. 
In addition, the strength of the army was placed at some 382,000 men in active service, 
including four divisions of republican Guards. [Ref.9: p.48] 
b. Border Tensions 
Iraq invasion of Kuwait not withstanding an agreement of October 1963 in 
which Iraq recognized an independent Kuwait and its boundaries, the Iraq-Kuwait border 
and islands question in effect remained deadlocked. Iraq would not agree to the 
demarcation of the land boundary unless Kuwait first showed some flexibility on the 
question of ceding or leasing Warba and Bubiyan. Kuwait demanded the prerequisite of a 
fully demarcated land boundary in accordance with its description in existing official 
correspondence before any consideration of leasing Warba would be entertained. In truth, 
Iraq's demand for some sort of control over the islands was less of a territorial dispute 
than a plea that the existing boundary be adjusted (or Kuwait's effective sovereignty over 
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the islands be substantively reduced) so as to improve Iraq's access to the sea, in 
acknowledgement of its disadvantageous position at the head of the Gulf. The status of 
the Shatt Al-Arab boundary and Iraq's preoccupation with gaining rights over Warba and 
Bubiyan were important factors in Saddam respective decisions to prosecute war against 
Iran during the Autumn of 1980 and annex Kuwait during the summer of 1990. [Ref.5: 
p.139] 
The fact that United Nations peacekeeping forces were stationed until 
January 1991 along the Iran-Iraq border and remain in position along the Iraq-Kuwait 
border surely underlines that the framework of country territory in the northern Gulf 
region remains unstable. On November 10, 1994, Iraq's acceptance of the UN 
demarcation of its boundary with Kuwait. Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council 
passed a decree that extended unconditional recognition to the UN Iraq-Kuwait border 
delimitation/demarcation. 
3. Internal Threat 
The primary threat to governments of the AGCC countries in future years will be 
internal, not external. The real threats stem from the prospect of prolonged stagnation of 
oil prices, pressures for political reform and the resurgence of political Islam Through 
secret agents working within the societies. Also, the internal threat includes the border 
disputes, which is another source of irritation and potential conflict among the AGCC 
countries. 
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a. Oil Stagnation 
In order to ensure the efficient distribution of these oil revenues, the ruling 
families have created state institutions. Government expenditures have flowed one way, 
while loyalty to the royal family has flowed in the opposite direction. The size and nature 
of the oil revenues have had other important consequences. They have given the ruling 
families of the Gulf much greater economic power than taxes could ever have produced. 
Massive state spending has made Gulf populations dependent on government-financed 
social programs. Moreover, there is a widespread recognition in the AGCC that the status 
quo is unsustainable. Piecemeal attempts to shore up the political and economic system 
through selective reforms will prevent radical changes. The reforms will gradually 
increase the influence of the private sector. These changes, however, will not prevent a 
gradual weakening of the economic power of the AGCC countries. Oil prices have never 
recovered from the 1985-86 crash and Arab Gulf oil producers have lost the "market 
share battle." In the short run, even small supply increases from non-OPEC and OPEC 
countries will force AGCC countries to remain at current levels. Over the long run, huge 
increase from Iraq and the Central Asian states may rob Arab Gulf producers of the 
increments in increased global demand they though would accrue to them. [Ref.IO: p.1] 
Some AGCC countries, notably the UAE, Qatar and Oman, have reacted 
to stagnation oil exports by investing in gas production and exports. The larger producers, 
however, have lagged behind in gas development either because of a lack of gas reserves 
(Kuwait) or available financial resources (Saudi Arabia). The development of Saudi 
Arabia's gas resources is inevitable given its enormous appetite for electric power; 
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desalinated water and petrochemical feed tocks, all of which require gas inputs. To do so, 
however, it will have to allow private firms to enter this strategic sector of the economy. 
b. Border tensions 
With increased oil exploration came more pressure to delineate 
boundaries. This led, after World War II, to the protracted Buraimi oasis dispute between 
Saudi Arabia (backed by the United States) and Oman and Abu Dhabi (Backed by 
Britain) over boundaries in the southeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula, which was 
believed to contain oil. In 1952, Saudi troops occupied part of the oasis. Arbitration 
failed, and in 1955 forces from Abu Dhabi and Oman under British command evicted the 
Saudi's. Not until 1974 did Saudi Arabia relinquish its claim, in return for a strip of 
territory giving it access to the Gulf east of Qatar. An individual's countable income is 
used both to determine the eligibility for, and computing the amount of, a monthly 
benefit. Countable income is defined as unearned. [Ref.6: p. 23] 
The latest dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia underlines this point. 
What has traditionally been a brotherly relationship between a regional power and its 
smaller neighbor has steadily deteriorated, with the undesirable outcome being that 
incomplete border arrangements have assumed center stage and contributed negatively to 
the bilateral relationship. It is obvious that confronting and addressing the boundary issue 
in an effective manner is essential to the return of normal relations. [Ref.5: p.328] 
The AGCC countries have not dealt successfully with the border disputes 
of its members. The most critical point of contention among the AGCC countries is 
clearly between Qatar and Bahrain. Qatar claims the island of Huwar and the adjacent 
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small islands, and in return, Bahrain claims al-Zubarah on the northwest coast of Qatar. 
The simmering quarrel reignited in the spring of 1986 when Qatar helicopters removed 
and "kidnapped" workmen constructing a Bahraini coast guard station on Fasht al Dibal, 
a reef off the coast of Qatar. Saudi Arabia mediated between the two countries and 
reached a short truce, whereby the Bahrainis agreed to remove the construction on the 
island. In 1991 the problem flared up again when Qatar decided unilaterally to take the 
issue to the international Court of Justice in the Hague. [Ref.4: p 51] 
There is no question that this conflict has weakened the unity of the 
AGCC countries by damaging both its credibility and its ability to speak in a single voice. 
c. Other Internal Threats 
The AGCC countries are seriously concerned about violence, terrorism 
and "extremism" in the region. These issues are a direct threat to the security and stability 
of the AGCC countries. The most serious group is the so-called "Islamic Movement" 
which is found in most AGCC countries. The Security Services in Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Kuwait and Bahrain have uncovered secret organizations that are using Islam to cause 
civil unrest and national disunity in the AGCC countries. In many cases, the 
organizations have external connections, both financial and organizational. Most of their 
members are political activists belonging to either the Muslim Brotherhood, or other 
independent organizations. In some of the AGCC countries, e.g., Bahrain, Iran was 
accused of providing political and financial aid for such organizations. The members of 
these secret organizations are highly sophisticated and their aims is to overthrew the 
AGCC governments and replace the present ruling system with Islamic Governments. 
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For example, in Oman the security services discovered an underground 
organization, politically motivated and used Islam to cause internal security problems and 
national disunity. The organization had more than 200 members, all of whom were 
arrested by the authorities for questioning in May 1994. This group was connected to and 
supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. The announcement of the arrest shocked the 
Oman society. The vast majority of the people of the AGCC countries are aware of the 
teaching of Islam and its basic tenets, which reject bigotry. Such organizations have done 
so much damage to the image of Islam in the world and we have to correct it by showing 
the true tenets oflslam, its principle and tolerance. [Ref.4: p.55] 
D. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
1. History Of The U.S. Security Assistance 
The United States is a relative latecomer to the Middle East. After World War II, 
it became the dominant external force in Iran and Saudi Arabia as the Soviets gained 
influence in Iraq. Britain remained the predominant influence in the Gulf countries and 
the main navel power in the Gulf. Until 1971, when Britain voluntarily withdrew, the 
United States relied on it to guarantee political stability. Afterward, Washington counted 
on the "twin pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia to keep the oil flowing and to oppose 
possible Soviet inroads. The Iranian revolution and the fall of the shah in January 1979 
created a power vacuum in the Gulf. [Ref.6: p58] 
Security assistance is a tool to serve the U.S. interests. By helping allies and 
friends to acquire and maintain the tools of war, the U.S. aids their self-defense. This 
assistance has high priority, especially in regions of the world where U.S. has vested 
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national security concerns, such as AGCC countries. Such help allows those countries to 
live in stable political and economic environments. 
In president Reagan's FYI 988 budget submitted to Congress, he included the 
general objectives and linkage between security assistance and U.S. foreign policy: 
For more than forty years, security assistance has been an essential 
element of U.S. efforts to help build a more secure and peaceful world. 
Successive administrations, backed by bipartisan support in Congress, 
have recognized the indispensable role security assistance plays in the 
successful conduct of global foreign and defense policies. The U.S. 
commitment to an effective security assistance effort reflects two 
:fundamental tenets of U.S. interest: a foreign policy based on global 
engagement and collective security, and a military strategy of deterrence 
and forward defense. Security assistance is an essential instrument in the 
implementation and integration of these twin pillars of our national policy. 
By helping friends and allies to acquire the means to defend themselves, 
the United States complements the rebuilding of its own military strength 
and increases the human and material resources available for defense of 
free world interests. 
Where regional instability exists around the world, security assistance has been 
used as a part to enhance the international relations. Whether motivated by economic 
gains, or through the realization that a particular combatant is preferable to the other, 
security assistance attempts to establish and reinforce relationships that are beneficial to 
the country providing the aid. [Ref.3: p.24] 
The strategic interest of the AGCC and the U.S. should not be established on a 
single depleted commodity (oil), but should be based on greater economic and political 
cooperation, such as increased investment and trades between the U.S. and the AGCC 
countries and the establishment of joint ventures between the American companies and 
AGCC countries national companies. The U.S. providing advanced technology and 
professional training for the people of the AGCC countries could advance the relation, 
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and the AGCC countries provide oil and other minerals that the U.S. needs. A positive 
step has already been taken to establish U.S.-AGCC economic dialogue to promote 
economic and political ties between the U.S. and the members of the AGCC countries. 
[Ref. I I: p.57] 
The U.S. works closely with the AGCC countries to contain the military threat 
from Iran and Iraq. U.S. Central Command has made steady progress in improving 
security cooperation with the AGCC countries since Desert Storm. U.S. approach has 
three dimensions. First, help each Gulf countries strengthen its own defense forces 
through U.S. defense sales and training programs, Foreign military sales are a good tool 
to facilitate the arms trades between the U.S. and the AGCC countries. Second, 
encourage regional defense cooperation among the AGCC countries through the 
collective security arrangements, the Western countries will always protect the region and 
will always reformulate a Desert Storm kind of coalition. Third, promote bilateral U.S. 
security cooperation with individual AGCC countries. [Ref. I 2: p.45] 
2. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
FMS is an appropriated program through which eligible foreign governments 
purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States Government. The 
purchasing government pays all costs that may be associated with a sale. In essence, there 
is a signed government-to-government agreement, normally document on a letter of 
Request (LOR) and a letter of Acceptance (LOA) between the U.S. government and a 
foreign government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a "case" and is an assigned a 
unique case identifier for accounting purposes. Under FMS, military articles and services, 
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including training, may be provided from DoD stocks or from new procurement. If the 
source of supply is new procurement, on the basis of having a LOA, which has been 
accepted by the foreign government, the U.S. government agency or military department 
assigned cognizance for this case is authorized to enter into a subsequent contractual 
arrangement with the U.S. industry in order to, provide the article or service requested. 
The focus of the security assistance program with any country is the cohesion of 
the U.S. and the foreign purchaser's policy objectives. Any assistance provided by the 
U.S. must not only strengthen the recipient country's objectives, but also more 
importantly, strengthen U.S. national security and promote world peace. The 
commonality of objectives represents the first litmus test potential foreign military sales 
must pass. Based on the nature of the request, the military department having cognizance 
over the defense article or service will normally receive a letter of request from the 
foreign country through U.S. diplomatic channels. 
Once the military department has received the LOR, the request must be validated 
to ensure that the potential customer is an eligible FMS recipient, that the article or 
service sought may be sold and that the request has been received through proper 
channels. The DSAA maintains a military Articles and Services list (MASL ), which 
identifies the military articles and service eligible for FMS. If the item requested is not on 
the MASL, a policy level decision must be made. (Re£3: p.29] 
3. Benefits From Operation Desert Storm 
Operation Desert Storm's primary objective was to secure Kuwait's freedom. 
Over 30 countries supported this objective. These countries all benefited in various ways. 
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The primary benefits attributed to Operation Desert Storm include preserving national 
sovereignty, securing the Middle East supply of oil and increasing regional and 
international stability. All countries access once they are secured. Thus, these are public 
benefit, they are non-rivalries and non-excludable. Different countries may receive 
different values, but that is consistent with public goods theory. 
There is one possible exception. The coalition's stated objective was to secure 
Kuwait's freedom. However, some critics assert that the U.S. had an additional objective: 
to destroy Iraq's military capability. If this was a U.S. objective, and no other country 
shared this objective, then the U.S. may have derived some private benefits from 
Operation Desert Storm. To the extent that the U.S. retains control over its own resources 
(and those provided by most other coalition members), it could pursue private objectives 
at expense of coalition's overall objectives. [Ref.13: p.173] 
a. National Sovereignty 
One obvious benefit is preserving national sovereignty. Kuwait is the 
prime beneficiary; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
However, the national sovereignty benefit extends beyond the countries directly 
threatened by Iraq. Operation Desert Storm may also increase the perceived commitment 
by large countries to protect smaller friendly nations, both formal and informal allies. 
Increasing this perceived commitment may reduce the necessity for this type of action in 
the future. Thus, larger countries acting as world policemen, including the U.S. and some 
Western European countries, receive an indirect national sovereignty benefit. Smaller 
countries that are potential targets of aggressive neighbors also benefit if increasing the 
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perceived commitment of larger, friendly nations helps forestall this aggression. [Ref.13: 
p.174] 
b. Oil Supply Security 
Security Middle East oil supplies is another benefit attributed to operation 
Desert Storm. The initial reaction is to claim that the greatest oil supply security benefit 
accrues to the countries most reliant on oil from the AGCC countries. According to this 
argument, Japan, France and U.K. received a larger relative oil supply security benefit 
than the U.S. Only Germany is less dependent on AGCC oil. 
The World oil market is an integrated market; changes in one source of 
supply or demand will affect all market participants. Thus, disruptions in oil supplies 
from Iraq and Kuwait would have impacts extending beyond consumers relying on those 
particular suppliers. [Ref.13: p.17 5] 
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IV. ECONOMIC AND MONETARY EXCHANGE RATE UNION 
The six countries share a common legacy of traditional economics, based on 
pastoralism, pearling, and some fishing. Before oil, the decline of pearling and onset of 
the world depression had rendered the six countries poverty stricken. The discovery of oil 
in the decades between 1930 and 1970 was fortuitous, and their economies remain 
depend on oil revenues, as will as oil-fueled industries. The discovery of oil in huge 
quantities has changed the AGCC countries and their inhabitants. The oil wealth enabled 
the AGCC countries to carry out explosive developmental programs. Economic 
prosperity touched every facet of life in those countries. 
The slow movement towards establishing a full monetary or economic union is 
not unique to the AGCC counties; it is understandable because of the difficulty and 
complexity union. It might appear that it is much easier and faster to establish a full 
economic or political union among a group of countries with a high degree of economic 
and political institutions, such as the countries of the European Union (EU). However, 
this is not necessarily true, since it is not completely reflected in the EU experience. 
The EU, which was formally (before 1992) known as the European Community 
(EC), was originally founded by six European countries in 1957 under the treaty of 
Rome. These countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands. In 1973, three more countries joined the EC, which are Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom; and in January 1981, Greece also became a full member in the 
EC. After a lengthy period of negotiation, Portugal and Spain also joined the EC in 1986. 
The EU is considered by many scholars as one of the best examples of moving towards 
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the establishment of full economic and political integration among a group of countries. 
Currently, however, the EU is experiencing some difficulties in achieving some of the 
goals of its agenda, which covers a wide range of activities in all fields. This is in part 
because some of the member countries have different views on how to achieve these 
goals, especially the goal of establishing a full monetary and economic union among the 
member countries. Moreover, there are some differences among member countries in 
regard to their economic objectives or priorities. As a result, the harmonization of 
policies of the EU member countries is usually a lengthy process and is often not easily 
achieved, especially with the admission of new members as indicated above. For 
example, it took the EU member countries about three decades of negotiation and 
modification before they were able to adopt a common or external tariff structure for the 
whole union. [Ref.14: p.150] 
Another example is related to the European monetary system (EMS), which was 
created over sixteen years ago in 1979 for the purpose of harmonizing monetary policies 
of member countries and for the creation of a single currency for the whole union. 
Currently, however, the EMS is facing many difficulties and is still far from achieving all 
of its goals. In fact, the whole EU experience at its current stage can only be described or 
classified as a single common market. [Ref.14: p.151] 
This chapter contains a brief discussion of the main elements of the unified 
economic agreement of the AGCC countries; it also provides a general review of their 
economies, trade, and exchange rate regimes. In the final section of this chapter, some of 
the major economic achievements of the AGCC countries are briefly reviewed. The 
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major difficulties and obstacles facing the AGCC countries and the appropriate ways for 
stimulating intra-AGCC trade are also discussed in some detail in the same section. 
A. THE CHARTER AND THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT OF 
THEAGCC 
The charter by which the AGCC was established consists of twenty-two articles 
(see Appendix A). This charter describes the main objectives and functions of the AGCC 
constituent bodies. It also outlines the legal privileges and immunities of the AGCC, 
which are required to achieve its objectives and undertake its functions. According to this 
charter, the AGCC is made up of three constituent bodies, which are: 
1. The Supreme Council 
The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the AGCC and its members are 
the heads of the member countries. The chairmanship of the Supreme Council is by 
rotation according to the alphabetical order of the countries. It meets annually in one of 
the countries. In general, resolutions on substantive issues are passed only by unanimous 
approval of the members participating in the voting. On procedural matters, resolutions 
are approved based on majority vote of the members present and participating in the 
voting. The main function of the Supreme Council includes the following: the 
establishment of the supreme policy of the AGCC. And review of recommendations, 
reports and joint projects submitted by the Secretary General: approval of the constitution 
of the commission for settlement of dispute and appointment of the members of this 
commission; amendment of the Charter; and approval of the budget. 
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2. The Ministerial Council 
The members of this Council are the foreign ministers of the AGCC countries. 
They meet once every three months in one of these countries to perform the functions 
outlined in the AGCC charter. 
3. The Secretariat General 
This body is made up of a secretary-general assisted by two assistant secretaries-
general (one for economic affairs and the other for political affairs), as well as other 
employees according to need. The main functions of the Secretarial General are to 
prepare reports, studies, and agendas, and to draft rules and regulations. It is also in 
charge of preparing the budget, doing any necessary follow up of the above matters, and 
carrying out any other tasks referred to it by the Supreme or the Ministerial Council. 
In addition to these three main constituent bodies, the AGCC has a commission 
known as "The commission for the Settlement of Disputes" that has the functions of 
clarifying interpretation of any article in the Charter and resolving disputes that might 
arise among member countries. Moreover, the AGCC has established "Rules of 
procedure" for this commission, as well as for the three main bodies; these rules can be 
used in carrying out their functions. [Ref.15: p.11 O] 
The Unified Economic Agreement (UEA), shown in Appendix (B), consists of 
seven chapters and twenty-eight articles. In review of this agreement, UEA is perhaps the 
most promising effort in economic cooperation among developing countries in recent 
times. If successfully implemented, it might be the most important achievement of the 
AGCC countries. The UEA provides detail descriptions of the framework, mechanisms, 
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and principles of coordination, harmonization and integration of the economic activities 
of the AGCC countries. Kubursi [Ref.16: p.4-5] summarized the major elements of the 
UEA, as follows: 
(1) A free-trade area in the region with no tariffs on regional products and a 
common tariff on non-regional outputs. 
(2) A pooling of bargaining power when dealing with trading partners outside the 
region. 
(3) A common market area in which citizens of the Council member countries are 
free to move, work, own, inherit and bequest within each and every country of the 
Council. 
(4) A call for harmonization of development plans with the aim of complete 
integration. 
(5) A common oil policy and a coordinated policy of industrialization based on oil 
resources. 
( 6) A coordinated industrial development policy for the region as a whole. 
(7) Special emphasis on establishing and promoting joint projects in all sectors 
with the aim of tying the production chains of the region into a common development 
sequence. 
(8) Cooperation in the development of local technology and the joint acquisition 
of foreign technology. 
(9) Pooling of human sources to prevent harmful competition for scarce labor. 
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(10) Linking the regional markets through road, rail, air and water transportation 
networks. 
( 11) A common legal framework for trade and investment in the region; and 
(12) A common development aid policy. 
B. THE ECONOMIES OF THE AGCC COUNTRIES 
In general, the economies of the AGCC countries can be characterized as open 
with a relatively good or moderate degree of economic development. The economies of 
the AGCC countries are heavily dependent on the export of oil and natural gas and 
currently contain about 40% of the world's proven oil reserves and about 12% of the 
world's natural gas reserves. Moreover, four of these countries - Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi, 
and the United Arab Emirates are members of the Organization of petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Bahrain and Oman have less oil reserves than the other AGCC 
countries, but they could qualify to be members of OPEC. However, given the current 
condition of the oil market, there is no real advantage for them to do so. [Ref.17: p.486] 
Currently, oil and natural gas represent about 30-40% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of most of these countries and about 80-90% of their total exports. 
According to the AGCC Annual Economic Bulletin (1994), these countries at the end of 
1992 had a combined GDP of about 201 billion U.S. dollars at current prices (about 185.7 
billion U.S. dollars in 1985 constant prices). Tables (A.I) through (A.4) in Appendix (c) 
provide more details on the aggregate GDP of the AGCC countries in current and 
constant prices and also on the relative importance of the oil sector in the economies of 
these countries in the period 1985-1992. During this period and on average, about 55% of 
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the AGCC total GDP was generated in Saudi and 18/\ in the United Arab Emirates, while 
Kuwait contributed about 15%. The shares of the other three countries - Bahrain, Oman, 
and Qatar - of this period's GDP were about 3%, 5%, and4%, respectively. According to 
the AGCC Economic Bulletin (1994), the average GDP per capita for the AGCC 
countries during this period was 8500.00 U.S. dollars. [Ref.17: p.489] 
In general, the capital markets of these countries are relatively new, thin, and in 
need of major development. Bahrain, which is an offshore financial center, seemed to be 
the leading country among AGCC members in banking and financial services, which 
represent about 10% of its GDP. Although the economy of Bahrain is the smallest among 
the economies of the AGCC countries, it is most diversified. 
Before the 1970s, all the AGCC countries except Saudi Arabia were under the 
British protection. After independence and over the past twenty-five years, the economies 
of the AGCC countries have been through three different stages: 
1. The Oil Boom Stage 
This stage started in the early 1970s and continued until early 1982. During this 
period, these countries were continuously running big current account surpluses and were 
able to accumulate large sums of financial reserves. This was mainly a direct result of the 
oil crises of 1973 and 1979, which caused the demand and the prices of oil and natural 
gas to increase dramatically. For example, in 1980 alone, the surpluses of the AGCC 
countries reached level totaling about 51 million U.S. dollars. [Ref.18: p.88] As a result 
of large oil revenues, the AGCC governments were able to spend large amounts of funds 
on many economic and social development programs, including a variety of subsidies. 
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They also were able to build most of the basic infrastructure of their countries during this 
period. 
Serious efforts were made by the AGCC countries to diversify their economies 
and to reduce their dependence on oil, but not all efforts were completely successful, 
especially in the industrial sector. Some of the basic industries that were established by 
these countries are heavily dependent on oil, and in many cases duplications occurred 
among the AGCC countries. In this regard, Saudi Arabia's development of the major 
achievement among the AGCC countries in using industrialization to diversify its 
economy. 
Some of the AGCC countries, however, also used other approaches to reduce their 
dependence on oil. For example, Kuwait did not rely heavily on domestic 
industrialization, but instead turned to foreign investments, especially in the U.S.A. and 
Europe. In fact, Kuwaiti returns from their foreign and domestic investments exceeded 
their oil revenues for a number of years in the 1980s. on the other hand, the United Arab 
Emirates, with the lowest tariff and trade restrictions among the AGCC countries, tried to 
promote its foreign trade and to attract foreign direct investments to achieve more 
economic diversification. A few years ago the United Arab Emirates established a free 
trade area, ')abal ali" and offered many attractive incentives to achieve this goal to 
encourage the re-export business industry. [Ref.18: p.89] 
2. The Economic Recession and Deficit Stage 
This stage started in early 1982, about one year after the outbreak of the first Gulf 
war, the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, and it continued until the early part of 1991 
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when the second Gulf war, "Desert Storm" ended and Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi 
occupation. As a result of the first costly war, which depleted some of the financial 
reserves of all the countries in the Persian Gulf region, and because of the big decline in 
oil prices during this period, most of the AGCC countries experienced big declines in 
1982 in the surpluses of their current accounts. In fact, since 1983 several of these 
countries started to have increasing deficits in their current accounts, which they 
frequently financed by drawing down some of their external financial assets. The 
economic situation got even worse during the period 1984-1988 as a result of the 
worldwide economic recession and especially because of the big drop in the price o oil in 
1986, which reached $8 per barrel. [Ref.14: p.159] As a result, the AGCC countries 
experienced larger deficits during this recession period (see Table A.5) and their 
economies were growing at either negative on very low rates (see Table A. I through 
A.4). Although oil production of the AGCC countries increased during the 1983-1084 
period (see Table A.6), their oil revenues have declined, especially in the period from 
1986 to 1988, because of low oil prices (see Table A. 7). 
Consequently and in order to lower their deficits, almost all these countries 
reduced their public expenditures by cutting down on some of the economic and social 
programs and subsidies that they had initiated during the 1970s. At the same time, they 
also increased their fees and prices on almost all public services in order to increase their 
non-oil revenues. 
In addition, some of these countries started public awareness campaigns through 
their media to reduce consumption of public utilities and consumer goods. 
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With the end of the first Gulf war in 1988, signs of economic growth or recovery 
were evident throughout the AGCC region in 1989 and in the first half of 1990. In 
August 1990, this recovery came to a halt when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The liberation of 
Kuwait turned out to be extremely costly for the AGCC countries. In fact, with the 
exception of the United Arab Emirates, the cost of liberating Kuwait wiped out large 
portion of their financial reserves that they had accumulated during the 1970s and early 
980s. However, because of this invasion, there was some improvement in the demand and 
prices of oil in the Kuwait were not able to export any oil during this period. As a result. , 
all AGCC countries except Kuwait have realized big increases in their oil revenues 
during this period. [Ref.14: p.160] 
3. The Current Stage 
This stage started at the end of this first quarter of 1991, after the liberation of 
Kuwait. All AGCC countries with the exception of Kuwait had increased oil revenues 
during the occupation of Kuwait and after its liberation. Nevertheless, these countries, 
with the exception of the United Arab Emirates, continued to have deficits in their current 
accounts. This was mainly due to the large increases in government expenditures, which 
were inescapable because of the war. Because of the uncertainty about the actual cost of 
the war and about the future of the oil market, the monetary authorities in the AGCC 
countries had great difficulties during this period in estimating the expected revenues and 
expenditures. Most of them were not able to approve their 1991 budgets on time. As a 
matter of fact, Saudi Arabia did not release a budget for the year 1991, and almost all its 
expenditures were based on the 1990 budget. However, after the war was over some of 
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the private funds that had been invested outside the AGCC region were repatriated. As a 
result, the AGCC aggregate domestic liquidity and commercial banks deposits have 
increased during the period 1991 to 1993 (see Tables A.8 and A.9). Also, increased levels 
of private sector activity were apparent during the same period. [Ref.14: p.161] 
Nevertheless, these developments and activities were not big enough to shrink the 
budget deficits of these countries, which became more difficult to finance through 
drawing on financial reserves alone. Therefore, all the AGCC countries, and some of 
them for the first time in recent history, started borrowing on the international capital 
markets to secure the necessary funds. Moreover, some of these countries deficits and 
also to absorb some of the excess domestic liquidity that had developed. Unfortunately, 
competition in the oil market became more intense in the second half of 1993, while the 
divisiveness among OPEC members on quotas and on the appropriate ceiling continued 
to widen. Consequently, oil prices started to decline in the second half of 1993. 
Compared to 1992, average oil prices at the end of the first half of 1994 had declined by 
about 33% (see Table A.7). On other hand, the change in the demand for oil during that 
period was small and insignificant (see Table A. I 0). Currently and as a result of the 
decline in oil revenues, the economies of the AGCC countries are suffering another 
setback, and the AGCC governments are finding it more difficult to finance their budget 
deficit while paying for their increasing defense and military expenditures. 
Because of continuing budgetary deficits, the governments during the last two 
years have independently adopted a number of different measures and approved many 
policy changes designed to increase their non-oil revenues and to help promote the 
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diversification of their economies. Example of these measures and policy changes include 
the following: 
(1) The adoption of plans to privatize some of the projects and enterprises that 
are owned by these governments. 
(2) The encouragement of the private sectors of these countries to assume a 
greater role in the economic development process. 
(3) The removal and relaxation of many restrictions on foreign direct 
investment and the adoption of many policies and incentives to attract 
such investments to the AGCC countries. For example, during the summer 
of 1994, Oman and Saudi Arabia independently revised most of their laws 
provide more freedom to foreign firms doing business in these two 
countries, offer them more incentives, and no longer require that the 
foreign partner be a minority owner of a joint venture. In fact, Saudi 
Arabia now allows foreign firms in some cases to own up to I 00% of their 
business in the Kingdom with very few restrictions. 
(4) The adoption of measures to increase their non-oil revenues either by 
imposing a special tax or by increasing the fees of most of their public 
services and cutting down on most of their remaining subsidies and social 
programs. The first approach was adopted by Kuwait, which recently 
imposed a 10% defense assistance tax on all government employees in 
order to help pay for its defense expenditures and for the rebuilding of its 
army. Other AGCC countries, especially Oman and the United Arab 
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Emirates, are also studying the possibility of imposing certain types of 
taxes in the near future. The second approach was adopted by Saudi 
Arabia in January 1995 and by the United Arab Emirates in 1994. [Ref.14: 
p.164] 
C. AGCC FOREIGN TRADE 
AGCC foreign trade plays a very important role in the economies of these 
countries, since on average it represents about 70-75% of their total GDP. Compared to 
most developing countries and especially to other Arab countries, trade policy of all 
AGCC countries is relatively free. In recent years, however, tariffs in these countries 
have been increasing. During the period 1985-1992, AGCC trade was directed to the 
following regions of the world: 
(1) On average about 8.0% of their total imports and about 5.8% of their total 
exports were intra-AGCC. The annual ratios, however, for some of these 
countries during this period were sometimes lower than these average 
ratios (see Table A.11). 
(2) On average about 2.0% of their total imports and about 2.6% of their total 
exports were with other Arab countries. 
(3) On average about 3.9% of their total imports and about 4.6% of their total 
exports were with non-Arab Islamic countries. 
(4) On average about 35.9% of their total imports and about 17.2% of their 
total exports were with countries of the European Community. 
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(5) On average about 14.4 of their total imports and about 12.0% of there total 
exports were with the U.S.A., which used to be the major trading partner 
of the AGCC countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
(6) On average about 15.5% of their total imports and about 27.4% of their 
total exports were with Japan, which is currently the major trading partner 
for the AGCC countries and their largest importer of oil. 
(7) On average about 20.3% of their total imports and about 30.4% of their 
total exports were with the rest of the world (see Table A.12) for more 
detail). [Ref.14: p.165] 
As can be seen from the above ratios and from Tables A.11 and A.12, the intra-
AGCC exports and imports are very small in size compared to the AGCC total trade. 
They are still growing at slow rates since the formation of the AGCC in 1981. Also, these 
ratios are very low when compared to intra-trade ratios of the EU or NAFT A. This is 
mainly because these countries are major oil producing (exporting) countries, and most of 
their basic industries are heavily oil related and in many cases (such as petrochemicals) 
duplicated. As a result, trade in oil and petroleum products among these countries is very 
small and insignificant. In addition, trade among these countries in non-petroleum 
products is also small because the non-oil sectors of these countries are in general not 
fully developed and are growing at much slower rates than the oil and mining sectors see 
Table A.4. Although some of the economic diversification efforts that were made in the 
1980s in the non-oil sectors of these countries were successful, the products of these 
efforts were heavily subsidized. As a result, their actual production costs were higher 
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than those of other countries making the same products. Consequently, these efforts did 
not result in the hope-for trade creation. Therefore, as explain later in this chapter, new 
policies are needed to increase the trade in non-oil products and to enhance the growth 
rates of the non-oil sectors of these countries. [Ref.14: p.166] 
D. BACKGROUND REVIEW ON EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND THE 
CURRENCIES OF THE AGCC COUNTRIES 
The four AGCC countries - Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates - peg their currencies with limited flexibility to a single currency, the U.S. 
dollar. In other worlds, the values of their currencies are maintained within certain 
margins of their pegged rates of a fixed relationship to the Saudi Riyal (SDR), within 
margins of up to 7 .25%. These margins are not always noticeable, since these countries 
maintain a relatively stable relationship with the U.S. dollar, which is their intervention 
currency. Because this type of exchange rate arrangement depends heavily on the SDR, 
these four countries are sometimes referred to as "SDR peggers". The IMF classifies the 
two remaining countries, Kuwait and Oman, differently. Kuwait pegs its currency to a 
trade-weighted basket, while Oman pegs its currency to a single currency, the U.S. dollar. 
In general and as can be seen in tables (A.13) and (A.14) in appendix (C), The AGCC 
countries exchange rates against the SDR and the U.S. dollar seem to be relatively stable 
since the mid 1970s. This is because these countries have maintained a relatively stable 
relationship with the U.S. dollar. For this reason, there cross rates have also been almost 
fixed, especially during the last decade. [Ref.19: p. 716] 
The following is a general historical background on the currency and the 
exchange rate regime of each of the AGCC countries: 
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(1) Bahrain: The currency of Bahrain is the Bahraini Dinar (BD), which is 
divided into 1000 Files. The BD was created in October 1969 with an 
official rate of BD 1 per US $2.l 0. Before that and since 1959, the major 
currency used in Bahrain was the Indian Rupee. In June 18, 1966, Abu 
Dhabi, which is one of the seven emirates of the present United Arab 
emirates (U.A.E.), decided to adopt the BD after the big decline in the 
value of its adopted currency, the Indian Rupee. After the de facto U.S. 
dollar devaluation of August 15, 1971, the BD was linked for a short 
period to the pound sterling, and later on, its official rate against the U.S. 
dollar was realigned to BD 1 per $2.28. However, after the second 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar on February 13, 1973, this rate was 
realigned again to BD 1 per $2.53. But on January 28, 1978, an effective 
rate for the BD was established and the U.S. dollar was replaced by the 
SDR as the basis for determining exchange rates. Since that date, the BD 
has been linked to the SDR at the rate of BD 0.46190 per SDR 1 with 
allowable margins of fluctuations up to 7.25%. [Ref.19: p.719] However, 
the BD exchange rate against the U.S. dollar has been held constant since 
December 1980 at the rate ofBD 0.376 per U.S. $1 (or BD 1 per $2.6596). 
The Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) quotes the daily BD exchange rate 
against other currencies. [Ref.20: p.39] 
(2) Kuwait: The currency of Kuwait is the Kuwaiti Dinar (KD), which is 
divided into 1000 Fils. The KD was created on April 1, 1961, to replace 
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the Indian Rupee in use up to that time in Kuwait. The official rate of the 
KD at its creation was KD 1 per U.S. $2.80. After the devaluation of the 
U.S. dollar on August 15, 1971, the KD was briefly linked to the pound 
sterling, and later on its official rate against the U.S. dollar was realigned 
to KD 1 per U.S. $3.04. This rate was realigned again to KD 1 per $3.377 
after the devaluation of the U.S. dollar on February 13, 1973. On March 
17, 1975, Kuwait decided to peg the KD to a weighed basket of currencies 
instead the U.S. dollar. The currencies that are believed to be included in 
the basket are the British pound, Netherlands guilder, French franc, Swiss 
franc, German mark, Japan yen, and U.S. dollar, which are believed to 
have the largest share in this basket. [Ref.19: p.750] In general, however, 
the weights of the currencies in this basket are assumed to reflect the 
foreign trade and financial transactions of Kuwait. The Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK) on the basis of the pegged rate determines the KD 
exchange rate against other currencies, which is fixed but adjustable to 
reflect the changing relationship between the KO and the currencies in the 
basket. As of December 31, 1993, the respective buying and selling rates 
for the U.S. dollar were KD 0.33490 and KD 0.33479 per $1. [Ref.20: 
p.10] 
(3) Oman: The currency of Oman is the Riyal (OR), which is divided into 
1,000 Baizes. It was introduced on November 11, 1972. The OR is 
basically the same old Oman Riyal, which was known as the Saidi Oman 
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Riyal (SOR), but with a new name. At that time, the OR had the same 
official rate of the SOR, which was pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of 
SOR 0.416667 per $1 (or SOR 1 per $2.60571). Before that, the SOR was 
linked to the British pound until the pound was floated on June 26, 1972. 
After the second devaluation of the U.S. dollar on February 13, 1973, the 
OR official rate against the U.S. dollar, which is the intervention currency, 
was realign to the rate of Or 0.3454 per $1 or (OR 1 per $2.8952). 
However, due to the economic recession and the low oil prices of the mid-
1980s, the OR was devalued in January 1986 to the rate of OR 0.3845 per 
41 or (OR 1 per $2.6008). The fixed buying and selling rates for the U.S. 
dollar are maintained by the Central Bank of Oman (CBO). AS of 
December 31, !993, these rates were OR 1 per $2.6042 and OR 1 per 
$2.5974, respectively. The commercial bank rates for the OR against all 
other currencies are determined on the basis of London market rates. 
[Ref.19: p.375] 
(4) Qatar: As it was the case in most of the AGCC countries, the Indian 
Rupee was the major currency used in Qatar before June 16, 1966. On that 
date, Qatar and Dubai jointly created a new currency known as the 
Qatar/Dubai Riyal (QDR). This currency was managed by the Qatar-
Dubai currency board and was also used by all remaining emirates except 
Abu Dhabi, which as indicated earlier had adopted the Bahraini Dinar. 
The QDR was pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of QDR 4.76 per $1. 
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However, after the U.S. dollar devaluation on August 15, 1971, the QDR 
was linked to the British pound until June 26, 1972, when the pound was 
floated. The QDR official rate was pegged to the U.S. dollar again and 
was realigned to QDR 3.947 per $1. Consequently, Qatar decided to retain 
the QDR after changing its name to the Qatar Riyal (QR), which was 
divided into 100 Dirhams and had the same official rate against the U.S. 
dollar, as did the QDR. On March 18, 1975, an effective rate for the QR 
was established, and Qatar decided to link the QR to the SDR instead of 
the U.S. dollar. The official rate to the SDR was at QR 4.7619 per SDR 
with margins of fluctuation up to 7.25%. [Ref.19: pp.759.762] In 
December 1991, the Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA) was not able to 
maintain the QR parity within these margins. The QMA sets the daily 
buying and selling market rates for the U.S. dollar. As of December 31, 
1993, the rates for the U.S. dollar were QR 1 per $0.2746 (or QR 3.6415 
per $1). [Ref.20: p.406] 
(5) Saudi Arabia: The currency of Saudi Arabia is the Saudi Riyal (SRL), 
which is divided into 20 Quirsh or 100 Halalas. The SRL was created a 
few years after the establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932. However, the 
SRL was issued only in silver coins and was used along with gold 
sovereigns and coins of different nationalities. In 1953, the government of 
Saudi Arabia Authorized the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) to 
issue "pilgrim receipts", which are equivalent to traveler's checks 
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designed to meet the seasonal needs of foreign pilgrims for riyals and to 
relieve them from carrying large sums in heavy silver coins. At the 
beginning of 1960, the SRL was revalued by fixing its value in terms of 
gold at the equivalent of SRL 4.5 per U.S. $1. In March 22, 1961, Saudi 
Arabia joined the IMF and the SRL was made a fully convertible 
currency. In June 1961, the new paper currency replaced the old silver 
Riyal, gold coin, and pilgrim receipts. However, the official rate of the 
SRL was realigned twice after the two devaluations of the U.S. dollar in 
1971 and 1973. On March 14, 1975, an effective rate for the SRL was 
established and the SRL was linked to the SDR, instead of being pegged to 
the U.S. dollar. The SRL official rate became SRL 4.28255 per SDR 1, 
with fluctuation of 7.25%. Starting in 1977, the SRL effective rate was 
frequently adjusted within the limits of these margins, which were 
indefinitely suspended on July 22, 1981. [Ref.19: p.766] Nevertheless, the 
SRL has always maintained a relatively stable and fixed relationship with 
the U.S. dollar. As of December 31, 1993, the middle rate of the SRL 
against the U.S. dollar, which is determined by SAMA, was SRL 3.745 
per $1 (or SRL 1 per $0.2670). This rate, which has not changed since 
June 1, 1986, is used as the basis for determining the market buying and 
selling exchange rate for the SRL vis-a-vis other currencies. [Ref.20: 
p.432] 
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(6) United Arab Emirates (UAE): The currency of the U.A.E. is the Emirate 
Durham (DH), which is divided into 100 Fils. The DH was issued and 
circulated in the U.A.E. on May 19, 1973 to replace the Bahraini Dinar 
(BD) in Abu Dhabi and the Qatar/Dubai Riyal (QDR) in the other six 
emirates of the U.A.E. At time of its creation, the DH official rate against 
the U.S. dollar was equal to the old QDR, which was DH 3.9470 per $1. 
On January 1, 1976, the DH became interchangeable with the BD at the 
rate of DH 10 per BD 1, on September 1 of that year it also became 
interchangeable with the Qatar Riyal (QR) at the rate of DH 1 per QR 1. 
On January 28, 1978, an effective rate for the DH was established, and the 
DH was linked to the SDR instead of the U.S. dollar. The official rate of 
the DH became DH 4.761 per SDR 1 with allowable margins of 
fluctuation up to 7.25%. On May 5, 1979, the DH interchangeability with 
the BD and the QR was suspended when Qatar decided unilaterally to 
revise the QR effective rate. [Ref.19: p. 777] However, since 1980, the DH 
buying and selling rates against the U.S. dollar have been stable and 
unchanged. As of December 31, 1993, these rates, which are determined 
by the U.A.E. Central Bank, were DH 3.6730 and DH 3.6990, 
respectively, per $1. [Ref.20: p.530]. 
In all AGCC countries except U.A.E., there is a minimum reserve requirement of 
100% in gold and foreign exchange against the banknotes of their currencies. In the case 
of the U .A.E., there is a minimum reserve requirement of only 70% in gold or foreign 
55 
exchange against the banknotes of its currency and all demand deposits. In addition, in all 
AGCC countries there are no taxes or subsidies on the purchases or sales of foreign 
exchange, and al of them have facilities for providing forward cover against exchange 
rate risk. These facilities are usually provided by their commercial banks through their 
dealings in the international forward exchange markets. Similar forward facilities are also 
provided by the Central Banks of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, 
but only for their commercial banks. 
E. MAJOR ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND THE MAIN 
OBSTACLES FACING THE AGCC COUNTRIES 
Cooperation among the AGCC countries existed even before the formation of the 
AGCC in 1981. Regular meetings of the Ministers of Trade, Information, Industry, and 
Agriculture began in the early 1970s. As a result, joint bodies were formed among these 
countries, including the Arab News Agency, Gulf Television Joint Production, the Arab 
Gulf Labor Organization, and the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting. Moreover, 
joint agreement among Interior Ministries of these countries was signed in October 1980 
covering aspects of traffic, passports, security, and immigration. The practicalities of the 
laws governing this agreement and other related subjects, such as the issuance of the Gulf 
identity card to AGCC citizens, are currently in the AGCC Committees. As a result of 
these cooperative activities, several other significant business ventures and cooperative 
projects were approved, and most have already been built, especially during the period 
following the formation of the AGCC in 1981. The majority of these ventures and 
projects are focused in the industrial sector, such as the Saudi-Kuwait and the Saudi-
Bahrain Cement Companies, Aluminum Bahrain (ALBA), in which the Saudi Arabian 
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Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) took a 20% stake, the Sitra methanol-ammonia 
project in Bahrain with the Bahrain National Oil Company (BANOCO), with Kuwait's 
Petrochemical Industries Corporation (PIC) and SABIC as shareholders, and the Arab 
Iron and Steel Company (AISCO) which will be built in Bahrain and will feed iron 
pellets to the various steel plants around the Gulf. The latest major joint ventures include 
the Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Company (GARMCO), proposals for A fourth oil 
refinery to be built at Y anbu using funds from several Gulf countries, and petrochemical 
complexes in Oman and Bahrain (GPIC). [Ref.14: p.179] 
Although commercial cooperation among these countries is in general very 
limited, an agreement was reached between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to sell 1,000,000 
BID of crude oil to the Bahrain petroleum Company. 
In terms of financial cooperation, the AGCC countries have the majority share in 
the Gulf International Bank (GIB), which is based in Bahrain and was formed by the 
government of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in 1975. A second 
major joint venture in the financial services sector that includes two of the AGCC 
countries as members is the Arab Banking Corporation (ABC), which is based in Kuwait; 
Libya, Kuwait and the U.A.E. formed it in 1980. In order to develop a unified investment 
strategy, the AGCC established the Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) are to finance 
joint venture projects in all sectors of the economies of the AGCC countries and also to 
search for good investment opportunities worldwide. 
As to the ideas of a unified currency and the formation of a full monetary union, 
officials from these countries are still investigating the feasibility of such ideas. 
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Moreover, Central Bank Governors of these countries and other monetary officials are 
currently working on the development of a unified plan for the management of reserves 
and to monitor economic activities and capital movements between their economies. 
They are also discussing the harmonization of their economic policies and banking 
control procedures. [Ref.14: p.181] 
Currently, there are no restrictions or controls on capital mobility among the 
AGCC countries. However, there are some restrictions on the mobility of foreign labor, 
which represent about 50% of the AGCC labor force. The mobility of all AGCC member 
countries nationals is not restricted in any way. In fact, since March 1983, AGCC citizens 
are permitted to practice freely all types of economic activities, professions, and crafts in 
all AGCC countries. They also are permitted to own real estate in these countries, which 
is not available to non-AGCC citizens to practice economic activities in other member 
countries, has jumped from 854 licenses at the end of 1988 to 4, 191 licenses at the end of 
1993, which represents an increase of about 80% over a five-years period (see Table A.15 
and A.16). However, there are no statistical data on how many of these licenses actually 
have been used in establishing new businesses in these countries. Therefore, as indicated 
earlier, it is difficult to argue with certainty that the above figures are an indication of 
increased trade or economic cooperation among these countries. [Ref.14: p.182] 
Of course, cooperation among AGCC countries was never limited to economic 
and financial area only. To a lesser extend, cooperation among these countries extended 
to all other area, such as education and training, transportation, fishing, military and 
security, water, and electricity. Nevertheless, the AGCC at its current stage can only fit 
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the description of a free trade area. This is because there is no common tariff structure 
with the rest of the world. In addition, there are a number of other obstacles and 
important issues that AGCC officials are still hoping to resolve. Unless these obstacles 
and issues are resolved, it will be indeed difficult for the AGCC countries to move 
forward to achieve monetary and/or economic integration. The following is a general 
discussion of the main issues and obstacles. 
1. Different Subsidies Structure 
The AGCC countries in the early 1970s and 1980s instituted many social and 
industrial subsidy programs. The main purpose of these programs was to help provide 
housing for the public and to provide incentives for the private sector to participate in the 
economic and industrial diversification of these countries. Because of social 
considerations, a large portion of these subsidies has been directed to reducing the impact 
of imported inflation and towards basic domestic goods and services, such as gas, water, 
and electricity. In this connection, Askari [Ref.21 : p.182], 1990 advanced a number of 
observations with respect to Saudi Arabia that also applies to the other AGCC countries. 
He stated that: 
Many subsidies, although socially desirable, have been, and 
continue to be, costly, while contributing little to efficient economic 
development in Saudi Arabia. Most indirect government subsidies (in the 
form of input subsidies) distort resource allocation. The government 
should set a timetable to reduce and potentially to eliminate some 
operating and capital subsidies, and to increase user charges to reflect 
opportunity costs. Industrial subsidies should be targeted to specific 
industries in which Saudi Arabia enjoys a comparative advantage but 
where some assistance is needed because of infant industry-type 
arguments. 
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Recently, however, these subsidies have been in general greatly reduced and some 
are no subsidies have been in general greatly reduced and some are no longer offered by 
these countries simply because of their budget deficits and the decline in their oil 
revenues. Nevertheless, the structure of most remaining subsidies, especially industrial 
subsidies, differs in each countries In order for these countries to form a monetary and/or 
an economic union, it is very important for them to reduce their subsidies as suggested 
above and also to unify their structure. As explained in the previous chapter, these 
measures are among the most important issues that must be considered in the formation 
of an economic union in order to ensure the equitable distribution of all resulting costs 
and benefits from such a union. 
2. The Slow Growth of the AGCC Trade and the Absence of a Common 
External Tariff Structure 
The size and the growth rate of intra-AGCC trade are still low, and it was 
indicated that the AGCC countries must adopt extra measures to stimulate their trade in 
order for them to realize some of the benefits of economic integration. In this connection, 
Looney [Ref.22: p271] (1994) analyzed intra-AGCC trade and suggested a number of 
measures that the AGCC countries need to adopt to enhance this trade. He started by 
providing a comprehensive summary of the main reasons behind the slow growth of their 
non-oil intra-trade, which include the following: 
• Similarity of industrial output in each countries and lack of coordination. 
• Development of identical industrial plants in neighboring countries 
(petrochemicals, fertilizers, steel) has lead to increased regional 
competition. 
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• With each country at a similar stage in its development and with similar 
industrialization strategies, there has been a high demand for capital 
goods, which are not manufactured in the region. 
• The Gulf market is wide open to the international market. 
• High domestic demand for some manufactured products leaving no 
surplus for export. 
• Absence of export promotion system. 
• Lack of information on export opportunities in neighboring states. 
• Minimal import duties on foreign goods from outside the region leading 
importers to continue importing with higher profit margins than trading in 
regional goods. 
• The dumping policy practiced by some foreign companies and the high 
cost of production in the Gulf countries. 
Looney [Ref.22: p272] argued that among the above reasons or factors, the first 
one seemed to be the most important. For example, by examining the relationship 
between the market and productive capacity for industries established so far in these 
countries, the following common pattern can be found throughout these countries: 
• There are export oriented industries sets up with production capacities 
much bigger than local or even regional demand. Such industries in these 
enterprises are linked to export distribution. 
• There are a number of industries established primarily to meet domestic 
demand with production geared exactly to local demand, such as the food 
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and beverage industries. In general, these industries do not product a 
surplus for export. 
• There is a category of industries with design capacities unable to match 
domestic demand. The countries have to supply extra demand through 
imports, or the factories greatly exceed design capacity, thereby creating 
production beyond the economically optimal level. 
• Finally there is a category of industries to meet the needs of local 
consumers while offering surplus output for export. Given limited local 
markets and problems in finding additional markets, such industries 
usually experience considerable idle capacity. 
In order to enhance intra-AGCC trade, Looney [Ref.22: p.273] suggested that 
these countries must adopt corrective measures and policies that reduce or eliminate the 
negative impact of the above reason that are responsible for the slow growth of their 
intra-trade. However, because this solution or approach requires long term coordination, 
especially in industrial development, Looney also argued that besides the enforcement of 
all relevant resolutions adopted so far, two more short term steps can also be adopted to 
improve the current levels of trade with tangible results. The first step is related to the 
adoption of a unified common (external) tariffs structure, which is also very important in 
ensuring an equitable distribution of costs and benefits. Looney explain this step, or 
measure, by stating that: 
Action against unfair completion from foreign imports by the 
imposition of protective tariffs to raise the price of imports at least equal 
to the price of locally manufactured goods, especially if the goods are of 
equal quality and standards. The AGCC decision to impose minimum 
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duties of foreign imports of 4% from September 1983 was not adequate to 
meet the problem, which exists. 
The second step is to adopt a policy that calls for preferential purchasing of 
national products by government departments, especially where the local products are of 
similar specifications and quality to the imported alternative. Under this point comes the 
question of price differentials and of import license quotas to force importers toward 
commodities manufactured within the region. [Ref.22: p.273] Currently, some of the 
AGCCC countries have started adopting the second measure. For example, Bahrain now 
gives preference in all its government purchases to goods produced in Bahrain and other 
AGCC countries, but within certain margins of the prices of imported substitutes. These 
margins are 10% in the case of Bahraini products and 5% for products from other AGCC 
countries. 
In conclusion, Looney [Ref.22: p.274] argued that the AGCC private sectors, 
which have been given a lot of weight in terms of their role in future industrial 
development, cannot alone maintain a high level of growth in investment in future 
industrialization since these sectors are only interested in short term projects that provide 
quick returns. This is especially true after the confidence of these sectors in most of these 
countries was somewhat shaken by the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait. Therefore, the AGCC 
governments should not place a great deal of emphasis on these sectors in regard to long 
term industrial projects, which are very likely to have a greater impact on their intra-
trade. Instead, Looney suggested that: 
Because of the uncertainty gripping the region, and reluctance on 
the part of commercial banks, these projects will probably have to be 
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undertaken in the near term by governments, with special guarantees 
provided to the private sector. 
The AGCC countries need to adopt a more global view of trade by using 
overaII trade expansionary policies that can greatly improve the level of efficiency 
of their overall trade sector. This, in turn, could result in significant improvement, 
or faster growth in their intra-trade. A successful example of this approach to 
regional trade expansion has been the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). During the last twenty-five years, these countries were able to improve 
greatly the efficiency level and the size of their foreign trade sectors by adopting a 
set of aggressive trade expansionary policies that includes: 
(1) The active acquisition of foreign technology through a variety of 
mechanisms, such as licensing, capital goods imports, foreign training, 
and other means of technology transfers. 
(2) The promotion of specific industries, or products, especially those that 
have a clear comparative cost advantage in producing through directed 
export credit financing and/or subsidies for those industries or products. 
(3) The adoption of export-push strategies to encourage rapid export growth 
by using a balanced mix of fundamental export promoting policies, and 
market intervention tactics that are based on negotiations with foreign 
firms and trading partners. For example, most of the ASEAN countries 
adopted a wide variety of export incentives, and at the same time they 
agreed with their trading partners to graduaIIy reduce their tariffs and non-
tariff barriers. The AGCC countries could benefit a lot from the 
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experience of the A SEAN countries. For example, these countries could 
start by adopting the above trade expansionary policies and reducing their 
tariffs and trade barriers, which have been increasing in recent years. 
In order to enhance the non-oil intra-AGCC trade and in setting unified structures 
of subsidies and common external tariff, special attention also must be given by AGCC 
officials to the possible negative impact of what is Known as the "Dutch Disease." Loony 
[Ref.22: p.217] explains that: 
The Dutch disease model is based on a three-factor, two 
commodity full employment model of production and trade. Specifically, 
the economy is assumed to produce two commodities: one traded 
internationally (either exported or imported or both), the other traded only 
domestically since either transported costs or import restrictions prevent 
the commodity from being internationally traded. The two sectors 
producing traded and non-traded goods are assumed to have capital in a 
fixed amount that is given and non-shiftable in the short run. The labor 
force is fixed in the aggregate, but mobile between the two sectors. 
Many developing countries that depend heavily on the export of a single natural 
commodity such as oil, as in the case of the AGCC countries, are subject to be influenced 
by or suffer from the negative effect of that commodity. For example, before the 
discovery of oil, Nigeria used to grow all of its food supply. However, after the oil boom 
of the 1970s, Nigeria has become dependent on imports from other countries to secure 
food for its population. This was mainly because of the big decline in the output of its 
agriculture sector. Stevens tested the relevance of the Dutch disease to the AGCC 
countries and concluded that the non-oil sectors of the AGCC countries did not seem to 
suffer from any significant setback after discovery of oil, as in the Nigerian case, because 
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these sectors were in general underdeveloped and had relatively small productive 
capacities. In this connection, Looney [Ref.22: p.217] also argued that: 
It is not inevitable that Gulf manufacturing industries experienced 
net negative effects from the post 1973/74 oil booms. Given their low 
initial level of industrialization, and lack of an indigenous capital good 
sector, an appreciating currency by reducing the cost of imported capital 
and intermediate goods could provide a net subsidy rather than a cost to 
indigenous manufacturers. 
Looney also added that in comparison to other AGCC countries, the Dutch 
disease seemed to be more relevant in the case of Saudi Arabia because of its intense 
industrialization efforts during the 1970s and 1980s, which have exceeded the efforts of 
the other AGCC countries. Nevertheless, he concluded that it is impossible to say for sure 
that the Dutch disease has been a big obstacle to the development of Saudi Arabia's 
industrial sector. 
One major preventive measure that can be adopted by these countries 1s to 
subsidize those sectors that are likely to be harmed by the Dutch disease. However, the 
structure of these subsidies must be exactly the same throughout these countries, and 
extra care must be taken in identifying the sectors that should be targeted, or the 
recipients of these subsidies. Another possible measure that was suggested by Askari is to 
avoid the maintenance of an artificially overvalued real exchange rate, since this is 
economically counter-productive, especially for the export of non-oil products of these 
countries. 
3. Different Labor Laws 
The AGCC countries depend heavily on foreign, especially on the technical side. 
On average more than 50% of the labor force in these countries are non-AGCC nationals. 
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The labor laws of each of these countries are somewhat different. Serious efforts were 
made by AGCC officials during the last decade to harmonize their labor laws. However, 
there are still a number of these issues that need to be resolved, especially those related to 
the free movement of foreign laborers within these countries. For security concerns, 
AGCC officials are somewhat slow in resolving these issues because of the important and 
delicate factors involved. Without free movement of labor, it will be very difficult for the 
AGCC countries to move forward towards forming an economic union. 
4. Different Commercial Laws and Codes 
When the AGCC was formed in 1981, some of its member countries had stricter 
commercial laws and codes than others for establishing new businesses. This is especially 
true in the area related to safety, quality, packing, and expiration date of produced or 
imported products. Currently, the AGCC countries have already standardized some of 
these laws and codes, especially those in contradiction with the Unified Economic 
Agreement. Also, they have already agreed on the specifications of hundreds of products. 
Nevertheless, some of the laws that regulate the retail business, the commercial agency, 
transportation of products among these countries, and many others are not yet completely 
harmonized. 
5. Different Exchange Rate Policies 
The exchange rate regimes and polices of the AGCC countries and the need for 
their harmonization, which is the main focus of this study, have already been discussed in 
detail earlier in this chapter. Currently, the monetary authorities of these countries are 
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still investigating the most appropriate way for harmonizing these regimes and related 
monetary policies. 
6. Agreement on a Common Budget and on the Equal Distribution of 
Costs and Benefits 
Currently, AGCC officials are still working on developing a set of appropriate 
policies and measures that cover these issues. Without an agreement on these issues, it 
would be impossible for the AGCC countries to move forward towards the next level of 
economic integration. As a result, most attention in monetary integration literature has 
been focused on the benefits side in regard to equitable distribution among member 
countries. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Several important conclusions can be made or drawn from the theoretical 
background of four chapters provide answers to the research questions and to other issues 
addressed in this study. 
The AGCC was created for cooperation and integration in all fields and not just 
for security. Actually, the road to the AGCC started many years ago. A diplomat from 
AGCC countries has stated that the origins of the movement toward Gulf Arab 
cooperation reach back to 550 B.C. There are similar economic, political, social and 
security challenges. Perhaps among the most important factors in the composition of the 
AGCC, the people of the six nations recognize and understand their fraternity in the 
wider implications of Arab nationality. Although the AGCC was established in 1981, the 
common qualities had been in existence for centuries, and therefore, cooperation among 
these countries and the coordination of their effort on a regional level had been in 
existence for many years. However, the cooperation and the coordination lacked the 
formal regional entity to organize, unify and direct the effort toward the attainment of the 
common goals. 
The unity among the six AGCC countries is not strong enough for them to 
independently defend themselves. A key factor needed to achieve such unity is weapon 
standardization and interoperability among the AGCC militaries. Because the majority of 
imported weapons are American-made, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait currently 
share a level of standardization and interoperability, which allows them to work as one 
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military. Oman, Qatar and U.A.E need to follow suit. The U.S weapon systems appear to 
be the most suitable, giving the AGCC militaries the required power and mobility in 
order to defend themselves with autonomy. As oil prices decrease, the U.S weapons are 
the most affordable compared to other weapons from around the world. 
The analysis also shows that the AGCC countries at the current stage are not good 
candidates to form a single currency area or a full monetary union, because they have not 
yet met the necessary economic requirements. Forming a full monetary union requires, 
among other things, that the AGCC countries have the economic characteristics of a 
floater. More specifically, these countries should have the characteristics that allow them 
to fix their exchange rates among themselves and float them with the rest of the world. 
However, the classification results of both years under study show that in general the 
AGCC countries individually and as a group have the economic characteristics of a 
pegger, as mentioned above. In addition, there are a number of negative factors that do 
not make the formation of a full monetary union a favorable option at the current stage of 
AGCC economic cooperation, including: 
• Intra-AGCC trade still represents a small part of the total trade of these 
countries. 
• Several differences still exist among these countries in their monetary and 
banking policies as well as in tariff and subsidy matters. These states 
depend heavily on foreign labor. The mobility of foreign labor among the 
countries is still very restricted. Integration of financial markets is also a 
main requirement for the formation of a full monetary union. Currently, 
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however, some of the AGCC countries do not have formal stock markets. 
Moreover, the steps taken so far by these countries to integrate their 
financial markets and to attract foreign investments are somewhat limited 
compared to those actually required. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
Prospects for exchange rate regime unification and monetary integration among 
the AGCC countries, currently, there are certain features and incentives, which suggest 
that the AGCC countries are likely to benefit if they integrate, and that monetary 
integration (either partial or full) might be feasible in the near future, assuming they can 
work out major obstacles such as harmonization of their tariffs and subsidies. These 
features and incentives are as follows: 
(1) Through monetary and economic cooperation or integration, the AGCC 
countries can improve the utilization of their natural and financial 
resources and expand their absorptive capacity. These countries are major 
oil and natural gas exporting countries. This feature, if taken at its face 
value, does not seem important in contributing to their economic 
integration, since no significant trade is likely to take place between them 
in these or related products. However, these countries can greatly benefit 
in many other ways through adequate and serious coordination and 
unification of their energy and economic policies . 
. For example, during the last two decades almost all AGCC government spent 
large amounts of their oil revenues attempting to reduce the dependence of their 
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economies on oil and petroleum products through industrialization and other forms of 
economic diversification. However, most of their major efforts and investments in this 
regard were focused on petrochemical industries. Because of the lack of economic 
coordination among these countries, several of these industries were duplicated and were 
not adequately profitable, especially because of the heavy competition in the current 
depressed world market for petrochemical products. Nevertheless, there are still many 
opportunities for more economic diversification in these counties, especially in the non-
oil economic sectors. It is very important for the counties to coordinate or unify their 
energy and economic policies, for the following reasons: 
• The countries can avoid duplications m their future economic 
diversification efforts. 
• The countries can increase the efficiency of using existing oil-related 
facilities such as refineries and pipelines. For example, the East-West 
pipeline of Saudi Arabia can be used jointly by some of the AGCC 
countries in exporting some of their oil and natural gas from the Red Sea 
to increase their netback prices. This pipeline also can be a source of extra 
security for these countries if wars or political crises were to develop again 
in the Persian Gulf. In this connection, the AGCC countries are also 
studying the possibility of establishing a pipeline from Kuwait to Salalah 
in Oman, which are the only AGCC countries with free access to the 
Indian Ocean. 
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• The countries can pool some of their financial resources in order to 
finance large economic projects that they could not undertake individually. 
Good examples of such projects are the proposed Oman liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) project that will enable Oman to export LNG to Japan and to 
South East Asia, and the proposed underwater gas pipeline to India that 
Oman is planning to build in the future. These projects will be very 
difficult for Oman to finance alone, especially with the current situation of 
the oil market. 
• By having a common energy policy and a coordinated set of economic 
policies, the AGCC countries will be perceived by the world community 
as a large economic unit. As a result, it is very likely that these countries 
will gain more influence in OPEC and in the world oil market. This can 
greatly improve the international bargaining position of these countries 
with their major trading partners, leading to better terms of trade. By 
acting as one unit, these countries will also be able to market large 
amounts of their petrochemical products to many Asian and African 
countries that are recipients of economic assistance from AGCC countries, 
by tying economic assistance to the purchase of these products. 
(2) The future outlook for intra-AGCC trade in non-oil goods and services can 
be more promising. If these countries adopt more aggressive steps and 
more meaningful measures, their non-oil trade has the potential to grow at 
a faster rate in the future. For example, according to the AGCC annual 
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Economic Bulletin (1992), the number of business licenses issued during 
the period 1983 to 1990 to AGCC citizens for the purpose of practicing 
economic activities in other member countries was 1,973. This figure has 
increased in 1993 to 4,191 licenses. However, because there are no 
statistical data on how many of these licenses actually have been used in 
establishing new businesses in these countries, it is difficult to argue that 
the above figures are an indication of increased trade or economic 
cooperation among the countries. In fact, since the formation of the AGCC 
in 1981, the intra-trade for these countries continues to grow, albeit at very 
slow rates. The reason for this slow growth and the appropriate steps and 
measures for stimulating this trade are discussed in the forth chapter. 
The optimistic outlook indicated above is based on the fact that during the last 
few years AGCC governments started the privatization of some of their projects and 
services. They have also encouraged the private sectors to participate in the 
diversification of their economics, especially in non-oil activities. In addition, many 
restrictions on foreign direct investments in these countries were relaxed or completely 
removed by most governments, and many incentives have been established. All customs 
barriers and trade tariffs on goods and services produced by the AGCC countries have 
been removed. As more economic diversification in non-oil activities takes place in these 
countries, the size of their international trade and intra-trade is very likely to grow at 
much faster rates. This is of course assuming that duplication in these activities is 
avoided and steps towards stimulating their intra-trade (such as the development of 
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export promotions programs and strategies) are taken. As the above-mentioned initiatives 
start to become a reality, the economies of these countries will be more open to the rest of 
the world. As a result, exchange rates among the AGCC countries, which now are 
relatively stable and their rates with the rest of the world, will become more volatile. In 
order to avoid or reduce the negative impact of such volatility on their prices, intra-trade 
and balance of payments, the AGCC countries will find it in their best interest to adopt a 
unified exchange rate regime. 
(3) The AGCC countries already constitute a natural unity by virtue of their 
geographic and demographic makeup. Therefore, by spontaneously 
integrating their efforts in the political and economic fields, they have a 
very good chance of succeeding in forming an effective common market 
that will make their goal of monetary and economic unity much easier to 
achieve. The idea of having one big common market seems to be very 
attractive for the AGCC countries because of the great implications to 
their intra-trade and to the promotion and sale of their non-oil goods and 
services. This is especially true because: 
• Transportation costs of moving these goods and services among the 
countries are relatively low because of their geographical proximity. 
• The countries are small, either in physical size or population or both; but 
at the same time, the per capita income in these countries is relatively 
high. 
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(4) One of the main ideas behind the formation of AGCC was to establish a 
security arrangement among the six Gulf countries that is based on 
political and military cooperation. The urgent need for security became 
very obvious after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, in order 
for these countries to have an effective security arrangement, it is essential 
for them to have some form of monetary and economic integration. El 
Mallakh explained this point by stating "without economic steps at this 
stage, political and military security would have an inadequate base. 
Economic ties will be an immense tool to bring these countries together in 
a meaningful way." 
(5) Finally, the AGCC charter calls for several objectives and goals, one of 
which is the establishment of similar systems among the AGCC countries 
in various fields including finance, economics, commerce, education, 
health, information, transportation, tourism, legal, and administrative 
affairs. Moreover, AGCC Unified Economic Agreement specifically 
requires the AGCC countries to coordinate their financial, monetary, and 
banking policies. It also calls for more cooperation between monetary 
agencies and central banks of these countries, including an endeavor to 
create a joint or single currency. 
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APPENDEX A. THE ARAB GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 
CHARTER 
The States of 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
United Arab Emirates 




Being fully aware of their mutual bonds and special relation, common 
characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam; and based on their 
faith in the common destiny and destination that link their people; 
ARTICLE ONE 
Establishment of Council 
A council shall be established hereby to be named "The Cooperation Council for 
the Arab countries of the Gulf," hereinafter referred to as the "Cooperation council." 
ARTICLE TWO 
Headquarters 
The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
Cooperation Council Meetings 
The Council shall hold its meetings in the country where it has its headquarters, 
and may convene in any member country. 
ARTICLE THREE 
Cooperation Council Meetings 
The Council shall hold its meeting in the state where it has its headquarters, and 














To effect coordination, integration and cooperation between 
member states in order to achieve unity among them. 
To deepen and strengthen relations, link and scopes of cooperation 
now prevailing between their peoples in various fields. 
To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the 
following: 
Economics and Finance, 
Commerce, customs and communications, 
Education and culture, 
Social and health affairs, 
Information and tourism, 
Legislation and administrative affairs. 
To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, 
mineralogy, agriculture, water and animal resources; 
ARTICLE FIVE 
Council Membership 
The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the 
Foreign Ministers' meeting held at Riyadh on February 4. 1981. 
ARTICLE SIX 
Structures of the Cooperation Council 
The Cooperation Council shall have the following main structures: 
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1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes. 
2. Ministerial Council. 
3. Secretariat-General. 
Each of these structures may establish branch organs as necessary. 
ARTCLESEVEN 
Supreme Council 
1. Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and 
shall be formed of heads of member states. Its presidency shall rotate 
alphabetically according to the names of the member states. 
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. 
Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the request of any member 
seconded by another member. 
4. The Supreme Council shall hold its session in the territory of member 
states. 
5. A Supreme Council meeting shall be considered valid if attended by two 
thirds of the member states. 
ARTICLE EIGHT 
Supreme Council's Functions 
The Supreme Council shall endeavor to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation 
Council, particularly concerning the following: 
1. Review matters of interest to the member states. 
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic 
lines it should follow. 
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects 
submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval. 
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4. Review reports and studies, which the Secretary-General is charged to 
prepare. 
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international 
organizations. 
6. Approve the rules of procedure of the Commission for Settlement of 
Disputes and nominate its members. 
7. Appoint the Secretary-General. 
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council 
9. Approve the Council' Internal Rules. 
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General. 
ARTICLE NINE 
Voting in Supreme Council 
1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be 
carried by unanimous approval of the member states participating in the 
voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by a 
majority vote. 
ARTICLE TEN 
Commission for Settlement of Disputes 
1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called 'Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes," which shall be attached to the Supreme Council. 
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case 
separately based on the nature of the dispute. 
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and 
such dispute is not resolved within the ministerial Council or the Supreme 
Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission 
for Settlement of Disputes. 
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4. The Commission shall submit its recommendation or opinion, as 
applicable, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action. 
ARTICLE ELEVEN 
Ministerial Council 
1. The Ministerial council shall consist of the Foreign of the member states 
or other delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among 
members every three months by alphabetical order of the states. 
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold 
extraordinary sessions at the invitation of member seconded by another 
member. 
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session. 
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid attended by two thirds of the 
member states. 
ARTICLE TWELVE 
Functions of the Ministerial Council 
The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following: 
1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at 
developing cooperation and coordination among member states in the 
various fields and adopt required resolutions or appropriate 
recommendations. 
2. Endeavor to encourage, develop and coordinate activities between 
member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be 
referred to the Ministerial Council for further submission, with 
recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action. 
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies 
whereby the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action. 
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various 
private sector activities; develop cooperation between the member states' 
chambers of the member states among them. 
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5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more technical or 
specialized committees for study and presentation of relevant proposals. 
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit 
appropriate recommendations to the Supreme Council. 
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedure as well as the Rules 
of Procedure of the Secretariat-General. 
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-
General, for a renewable period of three years. 
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related 
to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary General, 
and submit recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the 
budget of the Secretariat-General. 
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare their 
agendas. 
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE THIRTEEN 
Voting in Ministerial Council 
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council on substantive matters shall be 
carried by a unanimous vote of the member states present and voting and 
on the procedural matters by a majority vote. 
ARTICLE FOURTEEN 
Secretariat-General 
1. The secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who 
shall be assisted by deputies and a number of staff as required. 
2 The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a 
citizen of one of the Cooperation Council states, for a period of three 
years, which may be renewed for one time only. 
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the assistant secretaries-General. 
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4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat-General's staff from 
among the citizens of member states and may not make exceptions with 
the approval of the Ministerial Council. 
5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of the 
Secretariat General and the smooth flow of work in its various 
organizations. He shall represent the Cooperation Council with other 
parties within the powers vested in him. 
ARTICLE FIFTEEN 
Functions of the Secretariat-General 
The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions: 
1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, integration and 
programs for member states common action. 
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work. 
3. Follow up the implementation by the member states of the resolutions and 
recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council. 
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial 
Council. 
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate 
with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its Expanding 
responsibilities. 
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budgets and accounts. 
7. Make preparations for meetings, prepare agendas and draft resolutions for 
the Ministerial Council. 
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convening of 
extraordinary sessions of the Council whenever necessary. 




The Secretary-General, the assistant secretaries-general and all members of the 
Secretariat-General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence 
and for common interest of the member states. 
They shall refrain from any action or behavior that is incompatible with their 
duties and from divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after tenure of 
office. 
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN 
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
1. The Cooperation Council and its organization shall enjoy on the territories 
of all member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as 
required realizing their objectives and carrying out their function. 
2. Representatives of the member states on the Council and the Council's 
employees shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in 
agreements to be concluded for this purpose among the member states. 
A special agreement shall organize the relations between the Council and 
the states in which it has its headquarters. 
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are 
prepared and put into effect, the representatives of the member states in 
the Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges 
and immunities established for similar organizations. 
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN 
Budget of the Secretariat-General 
The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states shall 
contribute equal amounts. 
ARTICLE NINETEEN 
Charter Implementation 
1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of 
the six member states named in this Charter's Preamble. 
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2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall deliver a true copy thereof to 
every member state pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General 
at which time the latter shall become depository. 
ARTICLE TWENTY 
Amendments to Charter 
1. Any member states may request an amendment to this Charter. 
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-
General who shall refer them to the member states at least four months 
prior to submission to the Ministerial Council. 
3. An amendment shall become effective if it is approved unanimously by 
the Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE 
Closing Provisions 
No reservation may be voiced with respect to the provisions of this Charter. 
ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO 
The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter 
with the League of Arab states and the United Nations, by resolution of the 
Ministerial Council. 
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic Abu Dhabi City, United Arab 
Emirates, on 21 Raj ab 1401 corresponding to May 25, 1981. 
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APPENDIX B. THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT 
With the help of God the Almighty; 
The Government of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council; in 
accordance with the Charter thereof, which calls for closer cooperation and stronger 
links; and, desiring to promote, expand and enhance their economic ties on solid 
foundations, in the best interest of their peoples; and, intending to coordinate and unify 
their economic, financial and monetary policies, as well as their commercial and 




1. The member states shall permit the importation and exportation among 
each other of agricultural, animal and natural resource products that are of 
national origin. 
2. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of 
national origin shall receive the same treatment as national products. 
ARTICLE2 
1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of 
national origin shall be exempted from customs duties and other charges 
having equivalent effect. 
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, 
transportation, haulage or unloading, shall not be considered as customs 
duties when they are levied on domestic products. 
ARTICLE3 
1. For products of national origin to qualify as national products, the value 
added ensuing from their production in members states shall not be less 
than 40% of their final value. In addition, the share of the member states' 
citizens in the ownership of the producing plant shall not be less than 51 % 
2. Every item to be exempted hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of 
origin duly authenticated by the government agency concerned. 
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ARTICLE4 
1. Member states shall establish a uniform mm1mum customs tariff 
applicable to the products of third countries. 
2. One of the objectives of the uniform customs tariff shall be the protection 
of national products from foreign competition. 
3. The uniform customs tariff shall be applied gradually within five years 
from the date of entry into force of this agreement. Arrangements for the 
gradual application shall be agreed upon within one year from the said 
date. 
ARTICLES 
Member states shall grant all facilities for the transit of any member state's goods 
to other member states, exempting them from any duties and taxes, what so-ever, without 
prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2. 
ARTICLE6 
Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the territory of 
a member state by its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between 
the customs authorities of the member states. 
ARTICLE 7 
Member states shall coordinate their commercial policies and relations with other 
states and regional economic groupings and blocs with a view toward creating balanced 
trade relations and favorable circumstances and terms of trade. 
To achieve this goal, the member states shall make the following arrangements: 
1. Coordinate export/import policies and regulations 
2. Coordinate policies for building up strategic food stocks. 
3. Conclude economic agreements collectively when and if the common 
benefit of the member states is realized. 
4. Work for the creation of a collective negotiating force to strengthen their 
negotiating position via-a-vis foreign parties in the field of importation of 
basic needs and exportation of major products. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL, CITIZENS AND 
EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
ARTICLE 8 
The member states shall agree on the executive rules which would ensure that 
each member states should grant the citizens of all other member the same treatment 
granted to its own citizens without any discrimination or differentiation in the following 
fields: 
1. Freedom of movement, work and residence. 
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest. 
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity. 
4. Free movement of capital. 
ARTICLE9 
The member states shall encourage their respective private sectors to establish 
joint ventures in order to link their citizens' economic interest in the various spheres. 
CHAPTER THREE 
COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT 
ARTICLE 10 
The member states shall endeavor to achieve coordination and harmony among 
their respective development plans with a view to achieving economic integration 
between them. 
ARTICLE 11 
1. The member states shall endeavor to coordinate their policies with regard 
to all aspects of the oil industry including extraction, refining marking, 
processing, pricing, exploitation of natural gas, and development of energy 
sources. 
2. The member states shall endeavor to formulate unified oil policies and 




To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement the member states should 
perform the following: 
1. Coordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and mechanisms aiming 
at the industrial development and the diversification of their productive 
bases and on integrated basis. 
2. Standardize their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their 
local production units to meet their needs. 
3. Allocate industries among member states according to relative advantages and 
economic feasibility, and encourage the establishment of basic as well as 
ancillary industries. 
ARTICLE 13 
Within the framework of coordination, the member states shall pay special 
attention to the establishment of joint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture and 
services, and shall support them with public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve 





The member states shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical 
cooperation aimed at building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and 
support of research and applied sciences and technology as well as adapting imported 
technology to meet the region's progress and development objectives. 
ARTICLE 15 
Member states shall set rules, make arrangement and lay down terms for the 
transfer of technology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes thereto as 
would serve their various needs. Member states shall also, whenever feasible, conclude 
uniform agreements with foreign governments and scientific or commercial firms to 
achieve these objectives. 
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ARTICLE 16 
The member states shall formulate policies and implement coordinated programs 
for technical, vocational and professional training and rehabilitation at all levels and 
stages. They shall also upgrade educational curricula at all levels to link education and 
technology with the development needs of the member states. 
ARTICLE 17 
The member states shall coordinate their manpower policies and shall formulate 
uniform and standardized criteria and classification for the various categories of 
occupations and crafts in different sectors in order to avoid harmful competition among 
them and to optimize the utilization of available human resources. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
ARTICLE 18 
The member states shall accord means for passenger and cargo transportation 
belonging to citizens of the other member states, when transiting or entering their 
territory, the same treatment they accord to the means of passenger and cargo 
transportation belong to their own citizens, including exemption from all duties and taxes, 
whatsoever. However, local transportations are excluded. 
ARTICLE 19 
1. The member states shall cooperate in the fields of land and sea 
transportation, and communications. They shall also coordinate and 
establish infrastructure projects such as seaports, airports, water and power 
stations, roads, with a view to realizing common economic development 
and linking their economic activities with each other. 
2. The member states shall coordinate aviation and air transport policies 
among them and promote all spheres of joint activities at various levels. 
ARTICLE 20 
The member states shall allow steamers, ships and boats and heir cargoes, 
belonging to any member states to freely use the various port facilities and grant them the 
same concerns fees, pilot age, and docking services, haulage, loading and unloading, 
maintenance, repair. Storage of goods and other similar services. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION 
ARTICLE 21 
The member states shall seek to unify investment in order to achieve a common 
investment policy aimed at directing their internal and external investments towards 
serving their interest, and realizing their peoples' aspirations in development and 
progress. 
ARTICLE22 
The member states shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary agencies and 
central banks, including an endeavor to establish a common currency in order to further 
their desired economic integration. 
ARTICLE23 
Member states shall seek to coordinate their external policies in the sphere of 




In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting 
therefrom, consideration shall be given to given to differences in the levels of 
development between the member states and the local development priorities of each. 
Any member states may be temporarily exempted from applying such provisions of this 
Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in provisions of this 
Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in that states or specific 
circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be a specified period and shall be 
decided by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
ARTICLE25 
No member states shall give to any non-member state any preferential privilege 
exceeding that given herein. 
ARTICLE26 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval by the 
Supreme Council. 
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2. This Agreement may be amended by consent from the Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE 27 
In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of member states, execution of 
the provisions of this agreement shall prevail. 
ARTICLE 28 
Provisions herein shall supersede any similar provisions contained in bilateral 
agreements. 
Drawn up at Riyadh on 6 Sha'ban 1401 Corresponding to June 8, 1981. 
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APPENDIX C. TABLES ON THE ECONOMIES 
Table A.1 
AGCC Gross Domestic Product (AT Current Prices) 
(Million Dollars) 
% Change GDP Year 
-9.2 153482.7 1985 
-15.9 129057.9 1986 
5.3 135955.3 1987 
0.7 136955.7 1988 
12.7 154324.9 1989 
12.9 174280.9 1990 
2.2 178131.2 1991 
12.7 200822.1 1992 
Source: AGCC Secretariat General. Economic Bulletin, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General Press, 
!994), 27. 
Table A.2 
AGCC Gross Domestic Product 
(At 1985 Constant Prices) 
(Billion U.S. dollar) 
Year GDP % Change 
1985 154.0 -4.6 
1986 153.5 -0.3 
1987 151.3 -1.4 
1988 160.3 5.9 
1989 163.8 2.2 
1990 169.5 3.5 
1991 173.3 2.2 
1992 185.7 7.2 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics: YearBook. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1994. 
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Table A.3 
AGCC Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
(At Current and 1985 Constant Prices) 
(Billion U.S. Dollar) 
Year GDP Per Capita GDP Per Capita Current Constant 
1985 9,586 8,803 
1986 10,095 8,414 
1987 9,758 7,904 
1988 10,470 8,105 
1989 11,094 8,022 
1990 10,511 8,034 
1991 12,295 8,009 
1992 12,810 8,599 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Year Book. Washington, D.C. 
IMF, 1994. 
Table A.4 
Relative Importance and Growth Rates of GDP Sectors 
In the AGCC countries 
(Percentage) 
Non-Mining Mining Sector 
Growth Growth Relative 
Rate Relative Importance Rate Importance 
-3.4 65.1 -16.6 36.5 
-4.8 74.2 -37.0 27.5 
1.6 71.1 14.9 29.8 
4.4 74.2 10.6 26.7 
-10.5 59.3 36.6 32.5 
19.3 61.6 35.3 38.4 
6.3 64.0 -4.0 36.0 










Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletm, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat 
General Press, 1994), 31. 
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Table A.5 
AGCC Balance of Payments 
(Million Dollars) 
1992 1992 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 Item 
27319.2 28696.4 14570.4 22275.4 11680.8 15792.6 9891.4 Trade Balance 
-- 82098.2 58056.2 60756 52224.7 51854.2 44916.2 Exports (F.O.B) 
--
(53401.8) (43485.8) (42480.6) (40363.9) (36061.6) (35024.8) Imports (C.l.F) 
(45530.7) (81554.6) (40447.4) (23771.8) (16894.0) (19108.9) (19999.5) Services &Unrequited 
Transfers 
18211.5 (52858.2) (25877.0) (1496.4) (5033.2) (3316.3) (10108.1) Total Current Account 
--
(29726.6) (7732.5) (10148.0) (7426.9) (9276.5) (5151.2) Capital Transfers 
(Private &Official) 
--
(82584.8) (33609.5) (11644.4) (1260.1) (12592.8) (15259.3) Surplus or Deficit 
Balance of Payments 
-- 82584.8 33609.5 11644.4 12460.1 12592.8 15259.3 Changes in Reserves 
Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General Press, 
1994), 61. 
97 
(1000 Barrel per Day) 

































Source AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General Press, 
1994),29. 
Table A.7 
Spot Prices of Selected Crude Oil 
(Dollar per Barrel) 
OPEC Basket Brent Arab light Year 
13.75 14.38 13.89 1986 
17.70 18.43 17.23 1987 
14.24 14.94 13.40 1988 
17.31 18.22 16.24 1989 
22.26 23.61 20.82 1990 
18.66 20.10 17.47 1991 
18.45 19.32 17.91 1992 
16.32 17.00 15.67 1993 
14.20 14.63 13.95 1994 
Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General 
Press, 1994) , 24. 
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Table A.8 
AGCC Domestic Liquidity 
{Million Dollars) 
Domestic Quasi Money 
Liquidity Money Demand Currencies with the 
Deposits Public 
76744.7 45506.7 18568.8 12669.2 
79715.8 9528.6 17217.2 12970.0 
84989.8 52425.3 18657.8 13906.5 
88588.1 56028.3 19787.2 12772.6 
92121.3 59834.3 20070.4 12216.6 
94194.2 57451.8 20162.9 15579.5 
103548.1 61842.6 25777.1 15928.4 
106555.9 61925.7 29023.8 15606.4 
108865.3 63983.2 29493.6 15388.5 
Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General Press, 
1994)' 47. 
Table A.9 
AGCC Commercial Banks - Deposits Structure 
(Million Dollars) 
Quasi monetary Govern Deposits Demand Deposits Year Total Deposits 
52694.3 45506.7 5318.8 18568.8 1985 
70602.9 49528.6 3856.5 17217.2 1986 
75665.9 52425.5 4582.6 18657.8 1987 
80157.2 56028.3 4341.7 19787.2 1988 
84469.2 59834.3 4564.5 20070.4 1989 
83544.4 57451.8 5929.7 20162.9 1990 
94111.8 61842.6 692.1 25777.1 1991 
99683.2 61925.7 8733.7 29023.8 1992 
102453.2 63983.2 8976.4 29493.6 1993 


























* Prehmmary Estimates. 





















Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General 

























Oman S.A. Bahrain 
155.3 1305.5 351.1 
142.9 1185.0 197.0 
173.0 1670.3 184.7 
223.2 1633.6 603.2 
273.1 2219.9 694.0 
260.3 2955.4 482.2 
370.l 2874.2 580.1 
519.5 1074.5 634.3 
Intra-AGCC Imports 
Oman S.A Bahrain 
718.6 496.0 1326.8 
483.7 385.3 I 003.6 
428.9 363.8 1327.9 
507.9 544.7 1407.2 
623.1 530.6 1475.6 
720.9 936.3 1588.7 
925.8 408.5 1711.3 



















Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol, 9 





















AGCC Direction of Trade Imports 
(Million Dollar) 
Rest of Islamic Arab Total the Japan U.S.A E.U Count Count AGCC Word 
144087.7 8452.9 8524.9 5679.9 16303.5 1212.9 674.7 3238.9 
100 19 19 13 37 3 2 7 
37611.9 7398.5 6274.9 5073.2 14377.1 1224.2 665.6 2598.4 
100 20 17 13 38 3 2 7 
38730.7 8190.8 6427 4807.6 14040.6 1493.9 761.6 3009.2 
100 21 17 12 36 4 2 8 
43459.I 10104.7 6543.8 5631.6 14842.2 1768.9 951.5 3616.4 
100 23 15 14 34 4 2 8 
45062.8 10720.2 2064.6 6232.3 15169.4 1896.2 1016.0 3964.1 
100 24 13 14 34 4 2 9 
48700.1 8565.6 6790.0 7047.2 18464.9 2070.7 1153.7 4608.0 
100 18 14 15 38 4 2 9 
58534.7 11571.6 7902.6 9814.9 20534.0 2396.6 1108.6 4206.4 
100 19.8 13.5 16.8 35.I 4.1 1.9 7.9 
69431.0 12517.1 10605.3 12049.6 24131.6 3318.3 1175.2 5633.9 
100 18.0 15.3 17.4 34.7 4.8 1.7 8.1 
Exports 
(Million Dollar) 
Rest of Islamic Arab Total the Japan U.S.A E.U Count Count AGCC World 
64843.0 20329 22476.9 2428.9 11905.2 3061.3 1410.3 3231.4 
100 31 35 4 18 5 2 5 
47530.6 13600.5 13382.3 4225.8 10510.0 1882.4 1283.8 2645.8 
100 28.6 28 8.8 22 4 2.6 6 
55187.4 17711.5 14231.4 6155.9 10091.6 2137.9 1825.9 3033.2 
100 32 26 11 18 4 3 6 
56368.9 18033.6 13245.9 8073.3 9395.7 1896.4 2121.5 3602.5 
100 32 24 14 17 3 4 6 
6678.0 21149.1 1567.2 10544.9 10648.2 2282.9 1954.3 4464.4 
100 32 24 16 15 4 3 6 
8600.2 28708.3 23463.4 11721.6 12740.0 2501.8 1694.7 5179.4 
100 33.3 27.3 13.6 14.8 3 2 6 
871777.l 23479.6 21597.3 11899.4 12784.3 5082.2 1838.3 5096.0 
100 28.7 26.4 14.6 15.6 6.3 2.2 6.2 
81742.0 21028.9 23305.8 11652.8 14281.5 5689.6 1864.4 3919.0 
100 25.7 28.5 14.3 17.5 7.0 2.2 4.8 
Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol.9 











































































AGCC Currencies Per SDR and Per Saudi Riyal (SRL) 
(Period Average) 
Kuwaiti Dinar Bahraini Dinar Omani Riyal Qatar Riyal 
SDR SRI SDR SRI SDR SRI SDR SRI 
0.525 0.0826 0.4747 0.1112 0.4154 0.0973 4.7472 1.1119 
0.3521 0.0824 0.4802 0.1124 0.4194 0.0979 4.7710 1.1121 
0.3376 0.0828 0.4567 0.1121 0.3988 0.0980 4.5758 1.1228 
0.3346 0.0813 0.4619 0.1122 0.4033 0.1016 4.6221 1.1231 
0.3443 0.0809 0.4851 0.1140 0.4324 0.1028 4.8532 1.1404 
0.3569 0.0822 0.4930 0.1135 0.4463 0.1038 4.8742 1.1225 
0.3518 0.0813 0.4907 0.1133 0.4495 0.1021 4.7596 1.0992 
0.3287 0.0824 0.4434 0.1122 0.4073 0.1007 4.2922 1.0761 
0.3178 0.0840 0.4151 0.1097 0.3813 0.1000 4.0186 1.0618 
0.3116 0.0844 0.4019 0.1088 0.3692 0.0980 3.8192 1.0536 
0.3034 0.0840 0.3854 0.1067 0.3540 0.0954 3.7311 1.0330 
0.3053 0.0830 0.3818 0.1038 0.3507 0.1031 3.6959 1.0049 
0.3424 0.0788 0.4411 0.1015 0.4481 0.1027 4.2704 0.9829 
0.36022 0.0744 0.4862 0.1004 0.4972 0.1027 4.7068 0.9720 
0.3749 0.0745 0.5053 0.1004 0.5167 0.1027 4.8919 0.9720 
0.3764 0.0784 0.4821 0.1004 0.4930 0.1027 4.6668 0.9720 
0.3849 0.0757 0.5105 0.1004 0.5220 0.1027 4.9418 0.9720 
0.3916 0.0778 0.5053 0.1004 0.5168 0.1027 4.8923 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.0178 0.1004 0.5295 0.1027 5.0132 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.5228 0.1004 0.5347 0.1027 5.0615 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.5371 0.1004 0.5493 0.1027 5.1998 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.5433 0.1004 0.5555 0.1027 5.2592 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.5364 0.1004 0.5485 0.1027 5.1928 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.5350 0.1004 0.5471 0.1027 5.1796 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.5417 0.1004 0.5539 0.1027 5.2439 0.9720 
N.A. N.A. 0.5192 0.1004 0.5310 0.1027 5.0267 0.9720 
0.39020 0.0711 0.5.81 0.1004 0.5196 0.1027 4.9187 0.9720 
0.3900 0.0775 0.5053 0.1004 0.5166 0.1027 4.8904 0.9720 
0.3873 0.0784 0.4961 0.1004 0.5073 0.1027 4.8025 0.9720 
0.3875 0.0783 0.4969 0.1004 0.5082 0.1027 4.8106 0.9720 
0.3893 0.0778 0.5022 0.1004 0.5116 0.1027 4.8621 0.9720 



































Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Quarterly Bulletin, 3rd Qtr, (Riyadh: 
National Center for Financial and Economic Data, Ministry of Finance and National Economy), 1991. 
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AGCC Currencies Per U.S. dollar 
(Period Average) 
Kuwait Bahraini Omani 
Dinar Dinar Riyal 
0.2866 0.3956 0.3454 
0.2750 0.3875 0.3454 
0.2762 0.3816 0.3454 
0.2703 0.3770 0.3454 
0.2787 0.3760 0.3454 
0.2879 0.3760 0.3454 
0.2915 0.3760 0.3454 
0.2960 0.3760 0.3454 
0.3007 0.3760 0.3454 
0.2919 0.3760 0.3820 
0.2775 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2790 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2937 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2920 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2904 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
N.A 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2893 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2902 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2932 0.3760 0.3845 
0.9933 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2915 0.3760 0.3845 
0.2890 0.3760 0.3845 































Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Quarterly Bulletin, 3rd Qtr. (Riyadh: 
National Center for Financial and Economic Data), Ministry of Finance and National Economy, 1991. 
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Table A.15 
No. of Licenses Given to AGCC Citizens to Practice Economic Activities in Other 
Member Countries During 1983-1988 
(License) 
Total Other Crafts Profession Economic Country Activities 
427 126 -- 5 296 U.A.E 
52 8 6 9 29 Bahrain 
242 -- -- -- 242 S.A. 
34 3 -- 3 28 Oman 
3 -- -- -- 3 Qatar 
96 24 2 8 62 Kuwait 
854 161 8 25 660 AGCC 
Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 5 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General Press, 
1990), 111. 
Table A.16 
No. of Licenses Given to AGCC Citizens to Practice Economic Activities in Other 
Member Countries During 1983-1993 
(License) 
AGCC Kuwait Qatar Oman S.A. Bahrain U.A.E. Item 
3672 335 204 98 715 191 2129 Active 
87 22 3 8 11 17 26 Profession 
432 15 1 1 14 25 376 Crafts 
4191 372 107 107 740 2"'"' .).) 2531 Total 
Source: AGCC Secretariat General, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 9 (Riyadh: AGCC Secretariat General Press), 
40. 
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